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PREFACE

Tliis

dissertation is the result of a fascination with the ability of

South Africa's White population to maintain itself as the dominant
political force in that country.

White rule throughout southern Africa has

demonstrated a remarkable ability for self-preservation that few scholars
and pundits of a decade ago believed possible.

Tlie

to most British and French colonies during the 1950

granting of independence
's

and early 1960

's

prompted a widespread belief that the advent of Black governments in Africa
south of the Zambezi was inevitable.
expectation.

Events have not yet sustained

Historians perhaps will determine that the

tliis

priiiiary

characteristic of the anti -colonial movement was that independence was

normally granted after only token opposition from
southern Africa, however, the permanent

Vfiiite

tlie

colonial powers.

In

population determined to

resist what former British prime minister Harold Macmillan once called the
"winds of cliange".

To date that resistance has been successful.

This study is based on the premise that the preservation of

'vVhite

rule

cannot be attributed simply to the presence of superior military or police
forces, although these forces were of course important.

Proper evaluation

of the non-Vfiiite political movements in southern Africa must subject them
to the same scrutiny applied to political groups anywhere.

In particular,

we must investigate their ability to recruit support and maintain
organization and communication among their followers.

Tliis is

best achieved

by various
through close examination of individual campaigns planned

non-White political organizations.

V

For the most part, the literature dealing

mth

the anti-apartheid

movement in South Africa has been written by protagonists motivated more

by a desire to advance the objectives of their cause than to explore in
depth the political characteristics of the organizations themselves.
sucli as

Books

Albert Luthuli's Let My People Go and Mary Benson's The African

Patriots provide insight into the goals of

tlie

anti -apartheid organizations

and the personal sufferings encountered by their members, but explain
little of the problems encountered by the political organizers among their

own people.

No major study of the Indian role in resisting apartheid has been made

previously, although individual Indians held important leadership positions
in the campaigns of the 1950 's.

Indeed, references to Indian political

activity are minimal in general studies of South African politics.
Peoples and Policies of South Africa

,

In his

for instance, Leo Marquard devotes

twenty- two pages to describing the African population, eight to the EuropeaJi,

eleven

Indians are described

to the Colored and only four to the Indian.

rather indistinctivei.y as "fertile, hard-working, ingenious people".

Studies

political activity
of individual campaigns and general comments on Indian
strength.
often credit the Indian Congresses with an unsubstantiated

comment of Pierre van den Berghe in Soutli Africa:
"the SAIC can claim the support of the

liiass

of the

reports a claim made often by the Congress itself.

A Study
.

.

.

Hie

in Conflict that

Indian population"

It conflicts, however,

Resistance in South Africa about
with Leo Kuper 's observation in Passive
the Defiance Campaign of 1952;

vi

"The level o£ participation in Natal was exceedingly low when compared with the extent
of Indian resistarice in the 1946 campaign.
Tliis is all the more remarkable, since Indian
life is seriously threatened."

To more accurately evaluate Indian politics, the primary sources used

have been the records of Congress conferences, the statements of Congress
leaders, and reports from the pro-Congress press, particularly New Age

and Indian Opinion

.

Although these are obviously not unbiased sources, they

remain the most useful in examining
Congress.

tlie

campaigns conducted by the Indian

Official press releases and public speeclies contained considerable

self- congratulation, but internal documents and correspondence dealt frankly

with obstacles encountered during each campaign.

Especially important are

of the Natal
the several Agenda Books published after eadi annual meeting

Indian Congress.

In each edition, the General-Secretary's Annual Report

reviews in detail the gains and losses of the previous year.

Comparison

a review of the
of these reports over an extended time, combined with

but also persistent
Congress press, discloses not only immediate problems,

weaknesses that proved impossible to correct.

From sudi comparison will

come the majority of data for this study.
the debates of the South
Additional information has been culled from

mid articles and books written by
Aficaii parliament, iVliite newspapers,

Most published

Congress movement.
Indian and African participants in the

docments, for they contain most of
sources are less useful than private
tlie

self-criticism.
self-congratulation witli little of the
was
in sponsoring a movement that
Indians joined with African allies

the
revolutionary not because it plotted

amed overthrow

of the government,
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but because its goals clashed witli the basic values of the
mvite group

supporting apartheid.

Apartheid was more thmi a policy introduced by the

new Nationalist party government in 1948, to be casually
overturned by the
election of a new party to parliamentary majority.

Apartheid reflected

the fundamental wishes of most Wliites on the question of South
Africa's

racial future.

Afrikaner

aJid

hnglishmen might at times clash over the

implementation of various aspects of the apartheid program, but they were
ujiited in their desire to preserve Wliite rule,

llie

main Miite opposition

to the Nationalist government, the United party, has been reduced since 1948
to criticizing apartheid's excesses and suggesting more economical means of

implementing it.

Ihe electoral opposition of the small Liberal and

Progressive parties has been persistent but not significant.
Given tlus overwhelming Wliite opposition combined with a readiness to

employ the force available to any modern government, it is not surprising
that the opposition to apartheid failed.

failure.

Tlie

Tliis

is a study of political

opposition of the South African goverament, however, cannot

be used to explain completely the inability of Indian Congress leaders to

build an effective political organization.

Tlie

basic assumption of Congress

officials that Indieuis would rally in support of an organization promising
them equal opportuiiities with Whites and Africans must be considered more

carefully than it has yet been.
I

am indebted to Professor Edward h. Feit for

tlie

intensive review and

thoughtful criticism which have considerably improved this work.
lIov\^ard

J.

Wiarda and George

valuable comments.

I

E.

Professors

Urch also read the manuscript and offered

remain, of course, responsible for all of

opinions and conclusions presented here.

tlie

facts,

.

viii

Indians and Apartheid in South Africa:
The Failure of Resistance (August, 1973)
Robert E. Johnson, B.A., M.A. University of Massacliusetts
Directed by: Edward E. Feit
,

Resistance to apartheid in South Africa is associated primarily

witli

African political organizations, with relatively little attention given to
opposition from other racial groups.

This is justified to the extent that

Africans comprise nearly three-quarters of the population

majority of participants in ant i- apartheid campaigns.
however, creates
the 1950 's.

aiid

provided the

Such a narrow focus,

a blurred image of the goals of the Congress Alliance in

An important part of the strategy of the main African resistance

organization, the African National Congress (ANC)

,

was to work in alliance

with Wliite, Colored and Indian groups, thereby demonstrating that members of
various races could work effectively together in a political system free of

apartheid laws
This dissertation evaluates the contribution made by an Indian

organization, the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), to the multi-racial anti-

apartheid campaigns of the 1950

's.

In doing this, it also examines the

origins of Indian politics in South Africa from the time of Gandlii and the
1940
conflict among IndiaJis for control of the NIC which took place in the

The study is based on the premise

tliat

's.

the preservation of Wliite rule

military or police
cannot be attributed simply to the presence of superior
forces, although these forces were of course important.

Proper evaluation

Africa must subject them
of the non-lVhite political movements in southern
groups anywhere.
to the same scrutiny applied to political

In particular,

support and maintain organization
we must inA^estigate their ability to recruit

ix

and communication among their followers.

This is best achieved through

close examination of the individual campaigns plajined by the NIC.

Examined

here are the passive resistance campaign of 1946, the Defiance campaign of
1952 and the campaign for the Congress of the People in 1955.

The primary sources used have been the records of NIC conferences,

tlie

statements of Congress leaders, and reports from the pro-Congress press,

particularly New Age and Indian Opinion

Altliough these are obviously not

.

unbiased sources, they remain the most useful in evaluating the political
activities of the Indian Congress

.

Especially important are the several

Agenda Books prepared after each annual meeting of

tlie

NIC.

In each edition,

the General -Secretary's Annual Report reviews in detail the gains and losses

of the previous year.

Comparison of these reports over ;m extended time,

combined with a review of the Congress press, discloses not only immediate
problems, but also persistent weaknesses that proved impossible to correct.

From such comparison has come the majority of data for this study.
The basic conclusion is that the NIC leadership failed to rally the

Indian people to participate in the Congress Alliance movement.

primary reasons are suggested for this failure.
was never able to demonstrate
for success.

tliat its

Three

First, the NIC leadership

resistance policies had any prospect

This became apparent as early as the first post-war resistance

campaign in 1946.

The crucial date was October, 1946, when the South

of the United
African government successfully ignored the weak opposition

Nations to its Indian segregation policy.

The NIC campaign had been

Assembly.
designed to peak with the meeting of the General

meeting passed with no change in

tlie

When that

domestic situation, the resistance

X

collapsed.

The NIC leadership was never again able to generate the

enthusiasm for resistance to apartheid created during the first nine months
of 1946.

The second reason was antipathy between Indians and Africans

.

Indian

relations with Africans had never been close and in Durban especially the

tension was evident between the two races in disputes over trade and housing
rights.

Tlie

comments of both NIC and ANC officials in the mid- 1950*5

indicate that Africans and Indians were reluctant to cooperate with one
another.

Tiie

Congress Alliance was not able to reverse racial patterns

that had been developed during the previous seventy-five years.

Given the

choice between being a racial minority in an African-dominated South Africa

or in a iVhite-ruled society, many Indians simply abstained from politics.
Given the first two reasons, the third is not surprising.

were unable to construct a viable political organization.

NIC officials

Membership

disappeared after 1946 because there was no apparent reason to belong to the
NIC.

Brandies did not bother to maintain communications with provincial

headquarters because the headquarters officials were not engaged in political

work of interest to the branches.

Provincial conferences could discover no

practical solutions to the organizational problem because none would work
until Indians were first convinced that the NIC was necessary to their
welfare.

Indians were never so convinced.

This triad of circumstances made the South African government's task
depicted by
in defeating the Congress Alliance easier tlian it is often

Congress members.

Tlie

bannings and detentions which began in earnest in

dealing with their
1952 without question prevented NIC leaders from

.
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political problems.

It is improbable, however, that had bannings and

detentions never occured the NIC leadership would have been able to solve
its difficulties.

Until late 1952, the Congress leaders were relatively-

free to prepare their followers for the rigors of political combat with

White authority.

That they failed in this task was demonstrated by the

poor Indian response to the Defiance campaign of 1952.

For the NIC, the

Defiance movement had already failed before the South African parliament

passed the Public Safety Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act in late 1952.
Few Indians supported the provincial leadership of the NIC after the end
of the 1946 resistance campaign and the primary cause was not the activity

of the South African police

xii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I.

p^gg

INDIANS AND APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
The Importance of Natal
Indians and the Congress Alliance
European Opinion: We Must Not Be Overwlielmed
Government Response: Control the Alien
Commentary

II.

THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN POLITICS

Resistance Without Organization
Resistance Without Control
Commentary
III.

THE REVIVAL OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Non-European United Front: No Compromise
With Whites
Resistance Revived
In the Transvaal:
Organize the Workers
In Natal:
The NIC: The Accommodationists Defeated
Commentary
IV.

THE FAILURE OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE
The Failure of Resistance
Aftermath of Resistance: Unity with the ANC
Leaders Without Followers
1952:
Organization in Decay
NIC:
1954: "Tlie People Shall Govern"
The Decline Continues
NIC:
Postscript: One Million Signatures Campaign
Commentary
1946:

V.

TI^ AFRO- INDIAN ALLIAiNCE
The Conditions of Rivalry
The Failure of Conciliation
Commentary

VI.

THE FAILURE TO ORGANIZE
The Formal Constitutional Structure
The Failure of Organization
The Failure to Communicate

1

4
6

11
17
26
31

34
38
42

46

50
52
58

64
68
74
75
81
82
85
88

93
96
97
104
107
112

120
121
125
126

xiii

Chapter

p^gg

Merebank: From Strength to Weakness
The Ninth Conference:
"IVe have made no
serious effort ..."
Commentary
VII.

CONCLUSION
NIC: The Final Years
NIC: Tliree Causes of Failure
The Future of Indian Politics

BIBLIOGRAPHY

130

133
137
142

143
147
151
154

LIST OF FIGURE,S
Figure

Figure

1

(Chapter

Figure

2

(Chapter I):

Figure

1

(Chapter VI)

I)

Racial Population of Five Natal
Cities in 1951

:

Racial Population of Natal,
1891-1951
:

Attendance at Five NIC Annual
Conferences

1

aiAPTER

I

INDIANS AND APARTIEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

For the past two decades apartheid in South Africa has been one of
the more controversial topics in political studies.

This is not

surprising, for the policy of apartheid, or separate racial development,

contradicts a strong international movement since World War
racial equality.

II

toward

The rhetoric of equality has been used to hasten the

dissolution of several European colonial empires and has created

political upheavals within the United States that continue today.
Opponents of racism have been able to justify their positions from

philosophies as contradictory as those of John Locke and Karl Marx, for

neither includes a belief in the incompat ability of different racial
groups.

Neither American, nor British, nor Russian law assumes that

some will be allowed to participate in politics, while others must be

excluded because of their race.
Few countries, of course, have been free of discrimination against
racial minorities within their borders.

The political system in the

American South for a hundred years after that country's civil war may
reasonably be regarded as de facto apartheid.
remains unique in

modem

The South African system

politics, however, because only here has a

majority of a
racial minority succeeded in the suboridination of the
country's population.

The institutionalization of apartheid has earned

Nations and forced
South Africa the frequent condemnation of the United

her withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Nations.
introduced by the
Apartheid as a fomal goveimental program was

2

Nationalist party after its victory in the parliamentary elections of
1948.

The Nationalists have since presided over the elimination of

limited representation of Africans in the South African parliament, the
removal of thousands of Africans and Indians into racially separate

"Group Areas", the proclamation of "Bantustans" for the independent

development of the various African tribes

,

and the virtual exclusion of
1

Africans and Indians from the

IVliite

university system.

Despite the furor

,

caused by the introduction of apartheid, it did not represent a

revolutionary change in South African life.

For the most part, the

apartheid legislation passed by the Nationalists in the 1950 's merely
gave legal sanction to social customs existing since the 1700's.

The

dominant Whites had never encouraged the mingling of racial groups; non-

white political participation had always been limited by provincial
legislation, and few Africans and Indians had ever been educated in White

universities.

Apartheid did challenge the hope of liberal South Africans

tliat

discriminatory social customs would eventually give way to allow at
least "Westernized" Africans and Indians to participate in South African

society on a par with Whites.

Apartheid thus produced the most extensive

non-white political activity in South African history.

African, Indian,

1950 's to
White and Colored opponents of apartheid attempted in the

fom

groups with
mass political organizations among their respective racial
system.
the object of ending White domination of the political

has been strongest among
As might be expected, resistance to apartheid
the racial groups excluded from political life.

Although the intensity

and Indians have accepted
of opposition has varied greatly, few Africans

3

with enthusiasm a policy guaranteeing them a subordinate role.

African

opposition to White exclusiveness began as early as 1912, with the
founding of the the African National Congress (ANC)

.

The early ANC did not

protest the exclusion of tribal Africans from politics, but argued that
entrance into the White political community should be granted to African
lawyers, teachers and other suitably educated in the Western style.

Tlie

tactics adopted of petitioning and visiting government officials to request

various legislative changes did not alter substantially until the 1940 's,

when a younger generation of African leaders formed a Youth Congress within
the ANC to press for more militant tactics such as mass demonstrations and

strikes.

Included among the new militants were African members of the

Communist party, who gave the ANC a "leftist" rhetoric and policy neither

shared nor understood by much of its membership.
Reports of the anti- apartheid movement in the 1950 's have emphasized
the African contribution, with relatively little attention given to the

efforts of the other racial groups.

This is justified to the extent that

Africans comprise nearly three-quarters of the population and provided the

majority of participants in anti -apartheid campaigns.

Such a narrow focus,

however, creates a blurred image of the anti -apartheid strategy during the
1950' s.

By working in alliance with other racial groups, the ANC hoped

effectively
to demonstrate that members of different races could work

together in a political system free from apartheid regulations.

To wage

South African Indian Congress
this common struggle, the ANC joined with the
(SAIC) in 1947 to begin the Congress Alliance.

In 1953 the Alliance was

(COD) for Whites and the
extended to include the Congress of Democrats

of mixed White and African
Colored People's Organization (CPO) for those

,

4

descent.
Tlie

primary purpose of this work is to evaluate the effectiveness

of the Indian contribution to the Congress Alliance.

This will be done

by examining the political organization of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC)
a provincial member of the SAIC, during two major Congress Alliance

campaigns

,

the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and the campaign in preparation

for the Congress of the People in 1954 and 1955.

It is assumed that the

state of political organization reflected both the degree of support

received from the Indian community and the NIC's ability to mobilize its
support for participation in the campaigns.

A secondary purpose

is to trace the development of Indian political

organizations from their beginnings as moderate groups seeking little more
than inclusion in the White political system to their adoption of mass

protest tactics against the entire structure of apartheid.
early Indian political movements does not exist.

necessary here to

A history of

A brief outline

is

emphasize that Indian participation in the Congress

Alliance represented a departure from prior political tactics.

Tlie

dominant theme of Indian politics before the 1940 's was a willingness to
accept anti-African legislation if it was not applied to Indians and a

corresponding reluctance to engage in joint political activity with
Africans.

This position began in the 1900 's and never entirely disappeared

from Indian political life.

The Importance of Natal

SAIC was a
Indian politics in Natal are stressed because the

because its three
coordinating group with no direct membership and

5

provincial affiliates were not of equal importance.

Of South Africa's

Indian population of 366,000 in 1951, more than 299,000 lived in Natal.
The NIC reflected this as the largest and most active SAIC member.

3

The

NIC was the only affiliate with a registered membership and regular

provinicial meetings.
The Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) is important primarily for the

politically militant leadership, including several communists, that came
to dominate that group in the 1940' s.

were copied in Natal.

The goals and tactics adopted here

The Transvaal leadership introduced the idea of

cooperation with African allies and resurrected the use of passive
resistance begun by Gandlii in 1907.

Its president, Yusef Dadoo, was

probably the best known Indian political leader.

The Indian population of

the Transvaal, 49,000 in 1951, was small, however, and the TIC did not

play a prominent role in the anti- apartheid campaigns of the 1950'

It

s.

will be considered for its ideological innovations, but its organization
will not be studied in detail.
Indians --18, 000
The Cape Indian Congress, due to the small number of
any significance
--in that province, did not conduct political activity of

nor did it produce any important political leaders.

No fomal Indian

State, where provincial
political organization existed in the Orange Free
than two dozen.
residency laws restricted Indian settlement to less
1950 's and represented
While the COD and CPO were first fomed in the

was potentially a valuable ally
few beyond their own leadership, the NIC
for the ANC.

maintained a
Founded by Mahatma Gandhi in 1894, the NIC

the 1940
membership of several thousands throughout

's

and 1950 's and

the entire Indian community.
claimed to represent the sentiment of

Congress

.
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officials expected Indian opposition to apartheid in Natal to be great.
Indians traditionally had opposed legislation restricting them to

segregated residential and business locations.

The Nationalist party's

Group Areas Act of 1950 authorized extensive relocation of the Indian

population with potentially large financial losses to its business class.
Few Indians welcomed the mandatory segregation provisions of the act.
Congress leaders argued that the Group Areas plan could not be halted

without first destroying the entire apartheid structure.

Union with the

African majority was considered essential to accomplish this.

Indians and the Congress Alliance

The importance of Indian participation for the other Congress

Alliance members was enhanced by the concern of the Government of India
for the treatment of Indians in South Africa.

By attacking apartheid at

the United Nations and at Commonwealth meetings, Indian diplomats created

world sympathy for the African as well as the Indian community.

Congress

Alliance leaders hoped international opinion would force the South African
government to modify or teminate its apartheid program.

Aji

effective

Indian political organization was essential in achieving this goal.

If the

South Aftican Indian community appeared divided in its opposition to
was likely to
apartheid, external support for the Congress position

weaken
for Indian
Membership in the Alliance, however, created problems
to create a well -organized
Congress leaders that threatened their efforts

mass membership group.

Tlie

most important was the general relationship

between the Indian and African communities.

A second obstacle existed in

7

the disagreements among Indians themselves over the best strategy to

oppose apartheid.

A successful Congress Alliance required Indians and Africans to work
closely together in the various Alliance campaigns.

Without such

cooperation, the Alliance would remain an artificial creation of its

leadership rather than a viable political organization.

To achieve this

cooperation required overcoming numerous economic and social barriers

between the two communities.
Indians shared both similarities and differences with Africans. The

most conspicuous difference was economic,

In the late 1940' s, the average

mean family income of Indians was more than three times that of Africans.^

Within the Indian community the disparity between rich and poor was great,
but Africans were more concerned with the economic advantages of the
successful Indian trader and merchant than with the poor Indian worker.
Indians controlled much of the trade at African locations near
centers.

urban

The belief among Africans that Indians took advantage of their

economic monopoly to exploit them was strong.

The economic situation was

regarded as a potentially serious threat to Congress Alliance unity by
Indian leaders.

A. M.

Kathrada, for instance, admitted that Indian

in the
economic superiority was the cause of several anti-Indian riots

of Kathrada
1950 's.^ What must be evaluated more closely is the claim

apartheid had overcome these
and other Indians that the common danger of
rivalries and made unity possible.
were subjected to
Complementing their economic advantages, Indians
Africans.
fewer discriminatory regulations than

Natal Indians were not

1940 's were legally free to
subject to African pass laws and until the

to own and occupy land on a par with Europeans.

In practice, only a

handful of wealthy Indians escaped the residential ghettos of the less
affluent but apartheid threatened to eliminate completely Indian purchase
of property in White residential and business areas.

Until the institution

of legislative apartheid, Indians had possessed at least the hope that

economic and educational achievement might gain them a status in South

Africa not available to Africans

.

Congress officials sought Indian support

by arguing that as the Nationalist government implemented apartheid,
Indians would eventually be subject to all the laws applied to Africans.

Common political struggle with the ANC was preached as the only alternative
to increasing discrimination under White rule.

Indians had always suffered some of the discriminatory measures
Indians, for instance, were excluded from the

applied to Africans.

political process throughout South Africa.

Natal Indians had once been

allowed to vote in provincial and municipal elections, but lost this
franchise in the 1920'

s.

One of the reasons for this exclusion was the

fear of Whites that Africans would ask for similar participation.

Like

Africans, Indians could not travel from one province to another without
boundaries
a special permit, although their movement within provincial

was unrestricted.

Indians were also subject to the economic color bar

that reserved many jobs for Whites.

The economic advancement of both

were not allowed to
Africans and Indians was restricted when workers

become supervisors and skilled technicians.

NIC leaders emphasized all

of these points in their quest for recruits.

urbanized than Africans
Indians throughout South Africa were far more

population resided in urban areas,
In 1946, two- thirds of Natal 's Indian

while nearly eighty- five percent of the Africans in that province were
considered rural inhabitants.^
In Durban, the population was divided almost equally among the

three main racial groups and Indians were strongly represented in other

Natal cities (see figure 1).

This situation made Natal, and especially

Durban, a potentially important center of Congress Alliance activity.

In

no other South African province did Indians comprise such a large

percentage of the urban population.

Indians and African workers often

lived as neighbors in common slums, particularly in Durban's Cato Manor
district.

Figure

1.

Racial Population of Five Natal Cities in 1951

Durban
Pietermaritzburg
Ladysmith
Dundee
Glencoe

White
151,111
32,139
5,503
2,455
2,062

Indian
160,674
16,048
3,031
1,423
1,293

Colored
17,457
3,414
389
279
61
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African
1-^^6,994

22,806
7,456
4,618
2,705

The task of organizing Natal Indians was complicated by the fact that

they did not form a cohesive bloc.

linguistic and economic lines.

Tliey

were divided along religious,

Most Indians were Hindus, descendents of

the first immigrants brought to South Africa as indentured workers in the

nineteenth century.

Tliese

early agricultural workers were followed by

primarily Moslem merchants, who formed an economic elite that continues
today.

Tlie

workers settled mainly in Natal, while an undertemined number

of merchants were attracted to the Transvaal during the various mining

booms of the late 1800'

s.

Both Hindus and Moslems maintained their own

religious and charitable organizations and relations between the two
Indian
groups often reflected the Moslem-Hindu differences found on the

10

sub-continent.

Communal differences were criticized frequently in the

newspaper Indian Opinion
Indian politics.

,

but it is difficult to assess their impact on

The NIC was open to Indians of both religions; most

leaders were Hindu, but Moslem officials were common.

In 1956, the NIC's

twenty-five member Executive Committee had a membership of sixteen Hindus,
g

eight Moslems and one Christian.
Indians unwilling to support the radical policies of the NIC did

maintain a separate identity as the Natal Indian Organization (NIO)

.

Tlie

NIO was dominated by the Moslem business community, but there is no evidence
of any attempt to build a mass political following.

The NIO did, however,

perpetuate a policy of accommodation with White authorities.

The

"accommodationist" position opposed racial segregation in principle, but

maintained that some form of race separation was inevitable.
Accommodationists were therefore inclined to work with Whites to achieve
a more favorable state of segregation than was often initially proposed

by the government.

During the 1950' s, the NIO submitted proposals for

the establishment of Indian "group areas", while the NIC fought the

establishment of mandatory segregation of any sort.
Tlie

NIC attitude toward apartheid contrasted sufficiently with that

of the NIO to be described as "confrontationist".

Confrontationists

directly challenged the implementation of segregation laws in an effort
them.
to demonstrate that the government could not enforce

popular tactic was passive resistance.

The most

To be effective, this style of

Indians combined with
political activity required mass support among the

and controlling this support
an effective organization capable of mobilizing
at the appropriate moments.

Both the origins of the accommodationist

,

.
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position and the conflict between the two groups for control of the
Indian political organizations are considered in later chapters.

European Opinion:

We Must Not Be Overwheljned

Neither the pattern of Indian protest in the 1950 's nor the

Wliitc

desire to prevent Indian social and political equality began with the

election of the Nationalist party government in 1948.

The problems faced

by Indian political organizers in the post-World War II years will be

better understood by recounting first the attitudes of Whites toward
Indians and the legislation prompted by these attitudes.

Indians first came to South Africa in the 1860

's

in response to the

quest of Natal sugar and cotton planters for a reliable work force after
efforts to employ African labor had failed.

Under an agreement between

the governments of Natal and India, immigrant workers were indentured for
a period of three years and were then given the option of either accepting

an assisted passage back to India or of becoming a free resident of Natal.

From the beginning, most remained.

Tlie

importation of new laborers to

replace those whose indentured status had expired guaranteed a steady
increase in the Indian population.

By 1872, 5,700 free adult Indians were

living in Natal and it is estimated that no more than half continue to

work on the agricultural estates

.

The remainder became traders

shop-keepers, domestic servants and fisheraien.

At this early date, barely

near-monopoly
a decade after their arrival in Natal, Indians already had a

White traders
of the fishing industry and were offering keen competition to
and the
Under the terms of both the original importation agreement

Indian free men
officially non-racial policies of the British Empire,

12

expected to receive the same citizenship rights as Wliites.

Similar

expectations were held by the Indian traders and merchants who soon followed
the plantation workers.

In 1843, Sir George Napier, Governor of the Cape

Colony, had extended equal protection of the law to all under British

jurisdiction, regardless of "distinction of colour, origin, language, or

creed

.'^'^
.

.

During the 1870 's the law usually was fairly applied to

Indian and white alike.

Relations between Indian workers and their white

employers have been described by one Indian author as "on the whole
.

.

.

quite

good.""*""^

Fifty Durban Indians had satisfied the property

requirements necessary to become voters by 1877; the number increased to
136 by 1881."^^

The relative racial harmony of the first two decades, however, did

not survive an increased immigration rate in the 1880' s, with its
inevitable increase in the number of free Indians.
13

the number of immigrants tripled.

Between 1876 and 1889,

Indians entered the Transvaal for the

first time, working as traders and merchants among European miners and
farmers.

Tlie

result was an increasingly vocal demand from Whites in both

Natal and the Transvaal that further Indian immigration be ended.

Many

desired repatriation of the entire Indian population, but labor
requirements in Natal precluded this.
The Natal government responded by appointing the first of numerous

now
commissions foimed during the next sixty years to study what had

become the "Indian problem".

The Wragg Commission reported in 1887 that

of Indians as indentured
W-iite opinion strongly favored the retention
14

with Whites.
workers, but opposed granting free Indians equal rights
opinion today.
This attitude remains characteristic of White

For the most

13

part,

TA/hites

have been willing to employ African and Indian labor where

the economy requires it, but liave never coupled this with an extension
of

civil "rights" to non-Wliite groups.

The Wragg Commission also noted oppostion to the open immigration of
Indian merchants.

A typical attitude

is that in a petition of the

PieteiTiiaritzburg Chamber of Commerce experessing fear that "the whole of

the social polity of this country would be disturbed" if restrictions were

not placed on future Indian immigration."'"^
later years became a constant theme:

The Chamber offered what in

registration of all free Indians and
1

ri

their required residence in locations controlled by the government.

The

prevention of contagious disease was often cited as a justification for such
locations, but wealthy, educated Indians with higher standards of living

were not exen^ted.

The proposal was not adopted since the government

considered it discrimination against a particular racial group.
In the Transvaal, however, a similar proposal was adopted.

opinion differed little from that of Natal.

Transvaal

Anti- Indian pressure was

sufficiently strong by 1885 to secure passage of legislation that might
have been drafted by the Pietemaritzburg businessmen.

Indians were

required to register at government offices and mandatory residence areas
for Indians were authorized.

17

Although the legislation was not strictly

enforced, Indian hopes that it would be repealed entirely when the

Transvaal came under direct British rule after the Boer War were not
realized.

The new Lieutenant Governor of the Transvaal wrote in 1901 to

the Colonial Office explaining that

"...

though in the eye of the

one man in a
(British) law theyare equal, there is not in this country

capable of
hundred who would agree to recognize the coloured man as

14

adntission to the same social standards as the white."

His superior

endorsed his opinion with the additional comment that a proposal for
admitting educated, Westerized Indians to equal status would be "very

unpopular

m

Transvaal."

19

This unpopularity is most often traced to two factors, a lower

standard of living which allowed Indian traders to maintain lower profit
margins than their White competitors, and a distaste for Indian social
customs that made their assimilation into White society unlikely.

Jan

Hofineyr, a minister in several South African governments and often

described as a "liberal" on the race question, indicated this mingling of
the social and economic aspects of anti- Indian opinion.

Although he

wrote that the Indian problem was "in the first instance, an economic
one.

.

."

and only "to a lesser extent a social one", his description of

developing anti- Indian opinion appears to contradict his own analysis:

"Tlie European may find it difficult to resist
the temptation of buying cheap at an Asiatic store
--but he will not welcome the establisliment of such
a store next to his own property; he will become
acutely conscious of maladjustment when he sees the
business of the Asiatic growing until he is able to
attract European salesmen and European girl assistants into his employment; and his aiiger will rise
within him when he sees European children playing in
So there is conthe street with Asiatic children.
feeling
of hostility,
stant friction, and a growing
and the perfectly natural detemination of the European to defend his economic standards against insidious attack from within. "_^

Hofmeyr expressed the fear that economic success might pemit Indians to
White
achieve a dominance over Whites which would weaken the image of
superiority.

15

The social threat was more important than the economic one since the
basis of South African society was supremacy of the Wiites and Indians

were not seen as candidates for assimilation.

They could therefore not

be allowed to achieve dominance or even equality with Whites.

The IVhite

view of the Indian position in South Africa was acknowledged by General
Smuts in a letter to MaJiatma Gandlii:

"I may have no racial legislation, but how
will you solve the difficulty about the fundamental difference of our cultures. Let alone the
question of superiority, there is no doubt that
your civilisation is different from ours. Ours
must not be overwhelmed by yours. That is why
we have to go in for legislation which must in
effect put disabilities upon you/^^^

D.

F.

Malan, once South African prime minister, less diplomatically

referred to Indians as an "alien element" in South African society.

22

White attitudes cannot be attributed solely to a fear of being
"overwhelmed" by a growing Indian population.

Indians did slightly

outnumber Wliites in Natal in 1900 and for two decades thereafter, but in
the Transvaal Whites exceeded Indians by nearly thirty to one in 1909.

Despite these differences in proportions of the population, White opinion

toward Indians differed little in either province.
More important perhaps than the size of the Indian population was the
fear that granting Indians equality would influence Africans to make the
same demand.

The British High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord

Selboume, aware of the possibilities, argued that the Indian passive
Africans
resistance campaigns of the 1900 's might be copied by educated

seeking White privileges

.^"^

This fear led General Smuts in 1920 to reject

Natal since he
the idea of parliamentary voting rights for Indians in

.

16

believed any such extension of the fra:ichise might create demands by
Natal Africans for the same franchise held by Africans in the Cape

province

24

Smuts' and Selboume's sentiments were echoed at the local level.

A Government minister campaigning

in Natal warned his constituents that:

"If the IndiaJis are successful, the next agitation will probably be from the natives here and
on the Witwatersrand for the removal of all taxes
otherwise they may threaten to strike. The
next step would be the brushing aside of the Constitution and all law and order and the establishment of mob rule.
.

.

.

Despite White fears of a united non-European front, Indians were not

prepared to cooperate with Africans.

Gandhi described the tribal African

as a timid creature "afraid at the sight even of a European child" and

incapable of understanding the technological superiority by whicli "a

handful of Europeans have been able to subdue such a numerous and savage
race as themselves."

beneficial:

The civilization missionaries brought was seldom

"Hardly any Negro who has come in contact with civilization
26

has escaped from the evil of drink."

Indian traders feared Africans,

Gandhi noted, for when cheated by traders Africans used physical force
to gain redress.

"So far as Indians and Negroes were concerned, it is
27

the former who feared the latter."
If Gandhi's view is at all representative, Africans were considered

inferior.

A few Whites were prominent

in Gandhi's South African passive

resistance campaigns, but there is no accou:it of African participation.
of a
Indians sought White rights and believe themselves fellow citizens

common Empire.

They protested legislation which grouped them with Africans,

17

but did not protest at ant i -African legislation itself.

Locations were

not necessarily evil if they were not Indian locations.

Smuts and

Selboume may have been correct in fearing the effect of Indian protest on
Africans, but there is no evidence to indicate that Gandhi or Indian
leaders solicited African support in the early 1900

Government Response:

's.

Control the Alien

In the 1880 's both Natal and Transvaal legislators began to propose

legislation restricting Indian commercial activity, halting immigration
and compelling a return of Indians to India.

Similar in intent to the

apartheid policies of the present Nationalist government, implementation
of this early legislation was limited by the frequent intervention of the

British and Indian governments.

Pressured by British colonial authorities

to comply with Imperial racial policies, White South Africa was not free

to regulate her peoples completely.

This did not last.

Most of these

external influences were eliminated with the weakening of Empire ties marked

by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.

As the Official Year Book of the

Union of South Africa notes, the Statute allowed South Africa "unhampered
freedom of legislation", even when
"^^
Law of England.

sucli

legislation was "repugnant to the

With the independence of India in 1947, the old

Imperial obligations were virtually ended.

By the 1950's, South Africa

was relatively free to implement racial laws sought since the 1880 's.
It is not intended to enumerate all the early racial legislation here,

but rather to cite such major Acts which affected Indians.

The legislation

can be divided into three fairly distnct periods determined by South

Africans increasing ability to regulate her domestic affairs.

During the

18

"colonial period" from the 1880

's

until formation of the Union government

in 1910 Wiite efforts to apply residential and commerical restrictions
to

Indians and compel their repatriation were often frustrated by
British

authorities.

In the second phase, from 1910 until the early 1930'
s, the

Imperial influence remained strong enough to require South Africa to

acknowledge the importance of India to Britain's international position.

White anti- Indian opinion was strong, but the South African government
attempted to placate it by seeking large-scale Indian repatriation.
final phase began in the 1930

attempts had failed.

's

The

when it became apparent that repatriation

The result was passage of increasingly more

restrictive anti- Indian legislation.

What the following review of each

period will make clear is the persistent Wliite refusal to grant equal
status to the Indian community.

British colonial policy required early South African racial
legislation to exhibit a subtlety not necessary in modem times.

When the

Natal provincial government passed legislation in 1893 depriving Indians
of the franchise because of their race, the Colonial Secretary refused to

accept it.

"We ask you to bear in mind the tradition of the Empire, which
29

makes no distinction in favour of or against race or colour."
Natal received home rule in 1894, however, and domestic opinion was
against the Imperial racial policy.

London approved legislation in 1894

prohibiting the parliamentary franchise to individuals who, although they

met educational and property requirements

,

came originally from non-

European countries which did not enjoy "elective representative
30

institutions founded on the parliamentary franchise."

Whites were not

but
acting against an immediate threat to their political domination,

20

against the future danger of an expanding Indian electorate.

were 9,309 Wliite voters and 251 Indian voters in Natal.

In 1894 there

31

Wliites devoted more attention to discouraging peimanent Indian

settlement than to removing a franchise for which few Indians qualified.

Although the governor of Natal refused in 1891 to approve a recommendation
of the Legislative Council that Indians be permitted to remain only as

indentured workers, he did accept an Act halting the granting of free land
to Indians after completion of their indentured service.

An 1895 law

passed under home rule attempted to further discourage permanent settlement
by imposing a

1-3

annual tax on all male Indians except indentured workers.

The law was modified in 1903 to include in the tax male children over the
age of sixteen and female children over the age of thirteen.

for non-payment was deportation to India.

The penalty

It was not a severe tax for

prosperous traders, but was a hardship for free Indians whose indentured
time had just expired.

Natal circumvented British reluctance to approve racial legislation

through general laws enforced only against Indians.

By this method,

restrictions were placed on the expansion of Indian trade, thereby
reducing the number of Indians who might be expected to earn enough to

pay the L3 tax.

An 1897 statute placed the authority to grant new trade

licenses with a licensing officer appointed by local Town Councils.

Although no racial quotas were stipulated in the law, licenses were denied
Indians even when they met the fomal requirements.

hesitant to admit its discriminatory intent.

Whites were not

The Durban licensing officer

testified before a government commission that "A European license is
license is
granted almost always as a matter of course, whereas the Indian

21

refused as a matter of course, if it is a new one."

33

These efforts to stimulate Indian repatriation failed.

IVhite

agricultural interests continued to demand indentured labor in the early
1900 's and the Natal government complied with their wishes, although an

increasing section of Miite public opinion opposed any further Indian
immigration.

As long as new workers were imported and no means existed to

force their return to India, the free Indian population continued to rise.
If Wliite opinion did not succeed in driving Indians from Natal, however,
it did eventually bring an end to labor importation.

In 1911 the government

of India, unwilling to continue the system in the face of increasing White

hostility, unilaterally terminated its agreement to provide indentured

workers for Natal.

With the end of indenture, the Indian population

stabilized and during the next forty years remained approximately equal to
Whites in Natal.
34

Year

Miite

1891
1904
1911
1921
1936
1946
1951

46,788
97,109
98,114
136,838
190,549
236,697
274,240

Indian
41,142
100,918
133,420
141,649
183,661
232,317
299,491

Colored

African

Total

6,686
9,111
11,107
18,629
24,895
31,485

455,983
904,041
953,398
1,139,804
1,553,629
1,708,483
1,803,347

543,913
1,108,754
1,194,043
1,429,398
1,946,468
2,202,392
2,408,563

The government of the new Union of South Africa formed in 1910

inherited the problems of its provincial constituents.

Although South

the British
Africa was now for the most part a self-governing member of

circumscribed by
Empire, her freedom of action on the Indian question was

British Imperial goals.

India had achieved new importance within the

22

Empire. after World War

I.

To placate Indian opinion, the South African

government was required to conduct extensive negotiations during the 1920 's
and 1930 's with representatives of the Government of India concerning the

treatment of Indians in South Africa.

Successful negotiations were unlikely,

for the two parties had fundamentally different goals

.

South Africa sought

the repatriation of most of its Indian population; India emphasized the

improvement of living conditions for Indians in South Africa.

White opinion in South Africa continued to demand legislation
restricting the freedom of Indians.

The differences between local sentiment

and international agreements were vital, for pacts reached between the

Union government and India required provincial implementation to be
successful.

Continuing differences between Whites and Indians are best illustrated
by examining the conflicting interpretations given to the Cape

Agreement, signed between India and South Africa in 1927.

Town

Indian hopes for

their future status in South Africa were raised because for the first time
the Union government recognized Indians as a permanent part of the

population:

"Tlie Union Government firmly believes in and
adheres to the principle that it is the duty of
every civilised Government to devise ways and
means and to talce all possible steps for the uplifting of every section of their permanent pppulation to the full extent of their capacity and
opportunities, and accept the view that in the
provision of educational and other facilities the
considerable number of Indians who will remain
part of the pemanent population should not be
allowed to lag behind other sections of the
people.

23

In subsequent years South African Indians used noncompliance
with

the "uplift" clause of the Agreement as a major charge against
Wliite

governments.

In retrospect, it is difficult to believe that the Cape
Town

Agreement offered any real solution to the Indian problem.

Tlie

Union

government expressed its willingness to encourage compliance with the

Agreement by provincial governments, but cautioned that allowances might
have to be made for the pressures of local politics.

Union leaders did not believe the "uplift" clause posed special
problems because they emphasized provisions in the Agreement for increased
repatriation.

It was hoped that the Indians "who will remain part of the

population" would be few.

The Joint Communique issued with the Agreement

noted South Africa's intention to subsidize the repatriation of Indians
37

and legislation to this effect was passed by the Union parliament.
The Agreement found little support among either White or Indian
opinion.

It was especially unpopular among Whites in Natal because of the

mild language planning repatriation.

38

Jan Hofmeyr felt public opinion

made fulfillment of the uplift clause impossible because Wliites were
reluctant to spend the funds necessary to create housing and educational
39

facilities satisfactory to Indians.

uplift concept.

Whites were often oblivious to the

In 1942 the Broome commission studying Indian penetration

of White housing areas reported that Whites did not understand the

Agreement's commitment to a permanent Indian population of any size.

The

40

uplife concept was as

unl<JLOwn as

repatriation was popular.

Indians, moreover, showed little inclination to leave South Africa.

The large majority regarded South Africa as their permanent home and did
where
not welcome the prospect of retuming to an overcrowded sub-continent

24

economic prospects were bleak.

41

By December, 1940, only 17,542 Indians

had left and this total was reduced by the admission of 2,212 wives
and
children of Indians already in South Africa.

The Indian population of

Natal and the Transvaal continued to rise, from 157,000 in 1921 to more
than 209,000 in 1936'.^^

Repatriation represented the Whites' ideal solution to the Indian
problem, but when India and South Africa met in 1932 to review the Cape

Town Agreement it was clear that the ideal could not be realized.

The

South African representatives declared the Agreement had failed because
repatriation had failed.

South African Indians concurred in part, asking

that repatriation no longer be considered a part of the Agreement but

continuing to demand that the uplift provision be fulfilled. '^^
not, however, optimistic.

They were

The government of India's Agent-General in

South Africa, filling a position created by the Agreement, commented that
there "can be no doubt that Europeans

.

.

.

judge the success or failure"

of the Agreement by the working of the repatriation plan.
a biographer of General Smuts

,

44

According to

by 1932 the Cape Town Agreement had become

45

a "fantasy".

There is no reason to doubt his evaluation.

With the failure of repatriation, it is not surprising that South
Africa entered a third phase in its attitude toward Indians:
domestic regulation.

increasing

White South Africa ignored Indian demands to be

uplifted to equal status while the Union parliament placed increasing
restrictions on Indians.

After 1932 the Cape Town Agreement served only

as an historical document used to support international statements

attacking South Africa's treatment of its Indian people.

For the most

its
part, the Union government refused to consider foreign objections to

25

domestic policy.

Unable to remove the Indians, Whites worked to perfect

their control of the "aliens" among them.
In 1932 the Union parliament passed legislation mandating the

segregation of Indians on the Rand gold fields
Indian businessmen.

,

an area long settled by

Indians with businesses outside reserved areas were

required to dispose of their properties to White buyers.

Protests from the

Indian government caused modification of the act to permit designation of

"Indianized" areas within White settlements as Indian residence areas.

The

compromise was not popular with Whites, for it thwarted a main purpose of
the original bill- -the removal of Indians from proximity with Whites.

46

White opinion was more completely satisfied vdth passage of the Asiatics
(Transvaal Land and Trading) Bill of 1939.

Purchases by Indians of land

owned or occupied by Whites and the issuing of trade licenses outside
47

Indian bazaar areas were banned.

Similar legislation was applied to

Natal in 1943 and the Union parliament instituted uniform national
limitations on Indian trade

,

residence and property acquisition in 1946

with the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act.

In 1950 the

new government of the Nationalist party fomally applied the racial
segregation principles of apartheid in the Group Areas Act.

Under Group

Areas, Indians were threatened with removal from "Indianized" residential
locations when these were located within White areas.
The "modem" era of Indian politics in South Africa began with

resistance to the Transvaal legislation of 1939.

A new generation of

campaign
Indian political leaders attempted the first passive resistance

since 1913 against the provisions of this act.

Further campaigns were

undertaken against the laws of 1943, 1946 and 1950.

Successive chapters

26

will describe these Indian resistance movements and
analyze the reasons
for their failure to affect apartheid in South Africa.

Commentary

Membership in the Congress Alliance was an unnatural political

position for Indians to assume but perhaps by the 1950 's an inevitable one
for Indians unwilling to accept apartheid.

Since the 1890 's the attempts

of educated Indians to acquire the benefits of White society had been
rebuffed.

If assimilation was not feasible and acquiescence rejected, the

only alternative was opposition to the entire concept of White domination
on which apartheid rests.

It was this conclusion which prompted many

Indian political leaders to accept the Congress Alliance.

The Indian hope of equal status with Wliites persisted for more than

sixty years but equality was never a viable goal.

Had White opinion not

been restrained by the external intervention of Britain and India the
legislation of the 1930 's and 1940

's

would probably have been applied in

the 1880 's by White legislative bodies unwilling to dilute the principle

of Wliite supremacy.

There is no indication that the testimony given to

the Wragg Commission by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce in 1897

did not continue to summarize White opinion in the following decades until

passage of the Group Areas Act was achieved in 1950.
Tlie

political postures open to Indians after World War II have

already been charcterized as "accommodationist" and "confrontationist".
The latter stance was clearly the more innovative for it required foming
an alliance with the African majority against the Whites.

Indians were

not numerous enough to confront the White political structure by themselves

and although it was not clear that the African numerical majority
could
be transfomed into a powerful political organization, it was
clear to the

Indian radicals of the 1940 's that the attempt had to be made.
liberals and foreign diplomats had not been able

to^

White

halt apartheid; the

Congress Alliance worked to prove through large-scale strikes, demonstration;
and boycotts that Whites could not govern South Africa by themselves.

The

Congress Alliance failed to achieve its goal and the NIC shared in this
failure.

The inability to organize effective political movements was a key

reason for this failure.

The following chapter will demonstrate that

Indian politics was more properly viewed as sporadic protest from the elite,

rather than organized protest from the Indian people as a whole.

.

.
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FOOTOOTES

"^A variety of terms have been used in the
past to designate South
Africa's racial groups. The tem "Indian" is often replaced
by "Asiatic"
Indians
South Africa include the descendents of immigrants
from what is
now Pakistan as well as India. Several thousand Chinese are
included in
this group, but Japanese are placed in the "White" group because
of Japan's
economic importance to South Africa.
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a iAPTER

II

ORIGINS OF INDIAN POLITICS

TIIE

Indians did not accept without resistance the progression of

legislation described in Chapter

Transvaal in the 1880

's

I.

Occasional protests began in the

and organized opposition in Natal under the

leadership o£ Mahatma Gandhi in the 1890's, where it continued

intemittently until 1913.

During this time Gandhi founded the Natal

Indian Congress (NIC) in 1894 and the Transvaal British Indian Association
(TBIA) in 1903.

Neither played a prominent role in the early Indian

political protests, as Indian politics was centered on the personal
leadership of GandJii.
It is impossible to stress too much the role of Gandhi as a catalyst

during these early incidents of protest.

During his residence in South

Africa, Gandhi lived at various times in the Transvaal and Natal and his

personal presence in a province determined where protest was most likely
to occur.

Wlicn he

returned permanently to India in 1914, the tactics of

passive resistance he introduced were abandoned until 1939.
Despite the growing anti-Indian sentiment evident in the 1880's,

neither Transvaal nor Natal Indians showed an inclination to form
political organizations designed to influence the White legislatures.
Individuals and deputations of prominent Indians protested to British

colonial authorities in South Africa and India, but the common attitude
was an apathetic belief that little would be gained through formal

political organization.'^
This apathy frustrated Gandlii's initial attempt to organize Transvaal
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Indians in 1894.

As a young lawyer trained in Britain
Gandhi did not

accept the personal indignities suffered during his
travels from Durban
to Johannesburg.

The Transvaal's anti-Indian legislation did not,

however, restrict the ability of Indian businessmen to
earn money, making

them content to suffer the humiliations of the social color
bar rather
than risk arousing even greater antagonism by public protests.^

Gandhi

was unable to find an issue sufficiently threatening to spark
organized

political activity.

Opposition to racial discrimination in principle was

not enough.
Gandlii returned to Durban in 1894 after completing legal business in

the Transvaal just as the Natal legislature was in the process of depriving

Indians of the parliamentary franchise.

of

By arguing that the franchise act

1894 was only the first of a series of anti- Indian legislation, Gandhi

was able to convince influential Durban Indians to protest to government
authorities.

Although less than 300 Indians were threatened with loss of

their voting rights, Gandhi maintained that trading priviliges were also
in jeopardy if the Indian community failed to protest.

Without Gandhi's prompting, it is doubtful any action would have been
taken against the frajichise act.

Under his direction, "several hundred

businessmen" collect 500 signatures on a petition submitted to the Natal
legislature.

The legislation passed, but the Indian action delayed it.

Gandhi's supporters eventually collected more than 10,000 signatures on a
3

petition sent to the Secretary of State of Colonies in London.

To conduct

this more elaborate signature drive, the NIC was formally established on
4

August 22, 1894.
The NIC adopted a constitution and an organizational structure that

"

^
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served as a prototype for later Indian political
groups.

A governing

committee was established, consisting of a president,
honorary treasurer,

twenty-three vice-presidents and "several other prominent
Indians."

This

committee was empowered to determine policy by majority
vote, subject to

eventual ratification by the Congress membership.

The committee was to

meet monthly; the entire Congress would convene yearly.

During the first

year, nine branches were established in Natal.

Potential membership was limited to more prosperous Indians by the
requirement for annual dues of L3.
during the first month.

Three hundred members were recruited

Later membership figures are not available, but

enrollment expanded sufficiently dr.ring the first year to provide a surplus
of funds for investment in Congress -owned properties.

were eager to join.
asking.

Not all Indians

Gandhi noted that "Everybody did not pay for the mere

Some required to be persuaded.

Tliis

persuasion was a sort of

political training, and made people acquainted with the facts of the
situation.

g

The new organization's statement of goals was quite general.

It

promised to promote the interests of Natal Indians, but made no reference
to the political system as a whole.

9

The vagueness was probably intentional,

Gandhi later disavowed any plans to achieve political equality with Whites.
He did pledge to seek "full civic rights":

freedom to trade and live

within the South African provinces on a par with

Wliites."^^

Similar

opinions on political rights were expressed by Transvaal Indians of the
TBIA, who reassured the Wliites that "in view of the existing prejudice
11
.

.

.

Indians do not fight for equal political rights."

The elite nature of the early NIC is clear.

Members were recruited
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almost entirely from the merchant class and in later
years many were uneasy

with the prospect of involving lower-class Indians in
Gandhi's passive
-

resistance campaigns.

12

In 1894 a majority of Natal 's Indians
were still

indentured workers and thus ineligible for membership in
a political group.
The NIC's first political action set the pattern for
a tradition of

moderate protest.

The protest petitions failed, but they were not
followed

by public demonistrations or resistance campaigns.

Resistance Without Organization

Gandhi's failure to build a permanent Indian political organization in

South Africa is best revealed by reviewing briefly his passive resistance
campaigns in the Transvaal and Natal.

Tlie

Transvaal protests occured in

1907 and 1908, while Natal was not involved until 1912.
Tlie

first Transvaal campaign in 1907 proved to be unique, for it was

the only one in which the support of the Indian community was nearly

unanimous.

The protest was prompted by the requirement of the new Asiatic

Law Amendment Act that all Indians obtain new residence permits to replace
those issued by the former government of the Transvaal Republic before the

Boer War.

The new measure was designed to remove Indians who could not

document their legal residence there before the Boer War from the Transvaal.
Indians reacted with dismay, for the registration requirements of the old

govemment had been indifferently enforced.
the old permit.

Many had simply not obtained

Others had entered the province illegally after the war by

posing as fomer residents who fled to Natal to seek British protection.
Gandhi was prepared to approve voluntary re-registration for those entitled
to

pemits, but regarded the compulsory aspect

as a racial insult since
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Whites were not required to register.

principle rather than substance.

For Gandhi it was a question of

For many other Indians the substance of

their business was at stake.
Aniied

with this issue, Gandhi gained extensive support for his

resistance plans without difficulty.

Before the final passage of the act,

Gandhi held mass meetings throughout the Transvaal to protest the

registration demand.

Oaths were taken vowing defiance of the law.

When

the campaign began, Indians had already been aroused and were ready for

political combat.
Gandhi's tactic was simply to boycott the registration offices.

This

required extensive public support for his position, but did not call for
extensive organization.

Registration offices were few.

Gandhi was able

to maintain an almost complete boycott with the aid of a personnally selected

and instructed group of pickets.

At no time were more than one hundred

pickets involved, thus facilitating his personal supervision.

Discipline

was easy to maintain and Gandhi did not hesitate to replace the few

individuals who did not follow his instructions.

The campaign did not have any more formal organization than this.
Gandhi did not make much use of the TBIA, although most of its members

supported him.

The opposition of a few "leading men of the community"

persuaded Gandhi not to seek a formal declaration of support.

This is the

only indication that some of the Indian elite in the Transvaal did not

support the mass boycott and their opposition does not appear to have

affected the success of the campaign.

Gandhi announced fomation of a

Passive Resistance Council during the campaign, but it had no fomal

organization or membership.

13
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The boycott ended when Gandlii and Jan Christian Smuts

,

head of the

Transvaal provincial government, agreed to a compromise on
registration.
Indians were to register "voluntarily".

Smuts would then grant registration

pemits to those who could prove domicile in

the Transvaal before the Boer

War, whether or not they had the old registration permits.

did not have the support of all the boycotters.

The agreement

Gandhi secured ratification

of the agreement at a mass meeting of Johannesburg Indians, but a large

minority remained opposed to any registration requirement and considered
the compromise unnecessary.

Two attempts to assassinate Gandhi were made

soon after, but within a few weeks most Transvaal Indians had registered.
Gandhi was the first to register.

Two facts must be noted about this campaign.

First, Gandhi had not

challenged the White monopoly on political power, but merely a single law

being applied to Indians.

Because of this, compromise was less difficult

to achieve than if the resistance movement had been demanding full political

rights.

By permitting the registration of most Indians living in the

Transvaal, Gandhi and Smuts had ratified the status quo.

The initial hope

of many Whites that the Asiatic Law Amendment Act would cause a substantial

reduction in the Indian population through repatriation was not realized,

but the principle of control through registration was maintained.
Second, Gandhi did not use the support he enjoyed during the campaign
to build a

pemanent political organization that might later challenge

the government on other issues.

To support Gandhi, Indians had only to

refuse registration, a passive act which nearly all were willing to perfoim.

Gandhi's pickets might have served as the cadre of a new political group,

indoctrinating and organizing during the campaign, but they did not.
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Gandhi thus had no existing organization to rally
when he called for
a renewal of resistance in mid-1908.

General Smuts had announced that

registration under the old guidelines was still mandatory
for Indians not
resident in the Transvaal during the voluntary registration
period.

This

affected many Indians who had left the Transvaal during the
Boer War, but

had not yet returned.

Most in this group had returned to India, and the

government feared that unless proof could be obtained of their foimer

Transvaal residence, many of those returning would actually be new immigrants

not entitled to registration peimits.

Gandhi claimed betrayal of the

compromise and Smuts refused to change his position.

pemits were burned by 2,300 Indians
begin a new boycott.

The new registration

in Johannesburg in a public rally to

Exact figures on the Indian response to Gandhi's call

are not available, but at least one Indian scholar believes it was much less

than during the first campaign.'''^
Smuts initially was uncompromising during this second phase of
resistance, and during 1909 Indian support for Gandhi eroded.

initial burning of registration certificates

,

Despite the

strong action by the Smuts

government, including extensive deportations of unregistered Indians,

reduced the number of resistors.
fighters remained."

Gandlii reported that "only the real

The struggle seemed hopeless; few were willing to

continue resisting if jail or deportation was to be the only result.
.

,

By

.
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the end of 1909 only Gandhi's personal disciples remained as resistors.

Resistance was suspended in 1911, following correspondence between
Smuts and Gandhi in which the Indian leader was satisfied that the worst

features of the 1907 legislation would be repealed.

At the same time, the

number of Indians deported and jailed during the preceding three years was
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great enough to warrant intervention by the British and
Indian governments.
To facilitate a final settlement, the Indian government sent G.
K. Gokliale,
a member of the Viceroy's Council, to negotiate with Smuts.

Gokhale spent

six weeks in South Africa, meeting with Indians in Natal and the
Transvaal

and with Smuts and other members of the Union government.

When he left

South Africa in November, 1912, he believed that the basis for a permanent
settlement of the Indian problem had been reached.

Goldiale reportedly

informed Gandhi, who did not participate in these negotiations, that the

Union government had agreed to repeal the 1907 act, remove racial barriers
to immigration, and end the L3 per year tax on free Indians.

Gokhale 's negotiations did not, however, produce a settlement.

The

Immigration Bill introduced in the Union parliament in 1913 was attacked

by Gandhi because it did not permit the free movement of Indians between
South Africa's provinces, did not repeal the L3 tax, and left uncertain the
admission to South Africa of Indian women married under religious rites in
India.

Since the offensive legislation was passed by the national government,

Gandhi planned to again renew the resistance campaign, not only in the

Transvaal but throughout the country.
Transvaal and Natal were involved.

In practice, however, only the

It was Natal 's first direct

participation in a resistance campaign.

Resistance Without Control

Gandhi planned that Indian volunteers from Natal would cross the

border into the Transvaal without authorization from the Transvaal
government, a violation of the Immigrants Regulation Act.

As in the past,

Gandhi's aim was to generate publicity about what he considered unfair
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discriminatory legislation, thereby forcing its
repeal.

IVhether or not

Gandhi expected to gain repeal by influencing
the Union parliaiiient alone,

or through a new intervention of the Indian
government is not clear.

In

any case, Gandhi felt it was his moral duty to
oppose the new law.

The immediate response to the call for new
resistance dissappointed
Gandhi; only a small group of personal followers was
active in the initial

border crossings in September, 1913."^^
situation unexpectedly changed.

Within a few weeks, however, the

Indian protest increased to a point where

Gandhi found it difficult to maintain control.
Gandhi was detemined to enlarge the scope of the resistance
movement

by enlisting the support of Indian indentured workers.

Those subject to the

L3 tax upon completiton of their indenture would be urged to go on
strike

until the tax had been repealed.
among the Natal coal miners.

Gandhi sent women volunteers to agitate

The miners did not immediately respond, but

several women were arrested and one eventually died in jail.
these police actions, the miners went on strike.

Angered by

Thousands left the coal

fields and marched to join Gandlii in crossing the border into the Transvaal.

Gandhi's action in seeking the miners' support may be considered a

shrewd political move, for his small group of personal followers were not
able to exert much pressure on the Union government.

18

Gandhi, however,

was startled by the result of his plan and unprepared for the task of

organizing several thousand new adherents.

"I received the news by wire and was as much
perplexed as I was pleased ... I was not prepared for this marvellous awakening. I had neither the men nor the money which would enable me
to cope with the work before ^^'"^g
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Gandhi was uncertain of both the miners' dedication to
his philosophy
of non-violence and his ability to control their participation
in his
campaign.

20

Additional strikes among Indian plantation workers occured

without any direct prompting by Gandhi, and led to amed clashes between
police and strikers.

The increasingly volatile situation brought new

pressure from the British government to achieve a solution satisfactory
to the Indian protestors.

War appeared imminent in Europe and Britain did

not want Indian troubles in South Africa to affect the loyalty of India
itself.

Under persistent prompting from the British and Indian governments,
South Africa appointed a Commission to investigate the Indian demands.

The

Solomon Commission, named after its chairman, Sir William Solomon, did not
have any Indian members and was therefore boycotted by Gandhi.

In private

talks with General Smuts, however, Gandhi reached an agreement paralleling
mttjch

of the Commission's recommendations.

The main points of both the

Solomon Commission report and the new Gandhi-Smuts compromise were embodied
in the Indian Relief Act of 1914, which eliminated the L3 tax and legalized

Indian religious marriages.

The Act did not end existing trade and

residence restrictions, but Gandhi felt enough had been accomplished to
leave this to the future, when Indians would be able to "educate public

opinion" in their favor.

21

The passive resistance campaign was ended.

What had Gandhi's last resistance campaign contributed to the
development of Indian politics?

At least one Indian scholar, Bridglal

Pachai, has referred to the events of 1913 as a "revolution".
is misleading.
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The term

By including the Indian workers of Natal in the resistance,

Gandhi had indeed brought into politics a group previously excluded.

But
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their involvement was brief and was not accepted by the
entire Indian
community.

None were enrolled in a pemanent political
organization such

as the NIC, for in 1913 Gandhi did not have the full
support of the group

he founded.

Opposition to extending the base of NIC support was demonstrated
in
October, 1913.

Gandhi was rebuffed when he called for the resignation
of

the NIC's two honorary secretaries because they did not adequately
support

the campaign in progress.

Before an audience of some 3,000 the secretaries

attacked Gandhi as a "professional agitator" whose "provacative and
inefficient policy" had weakened the Indian cause.

The secretaries claimed

Gandhi had enlisted the support of Indian indentured workers mthout

"consulting responsible Indian opinion."
the secretaries' resignations.
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The meeting refused to accept

That same month Gandhi abandoned the NIC

and formed a rival organization, the Natal Indian Association.^"^

The new

organization did not survive Gandhi's departure from South Africa in 1914.
This public rupture of Indian political unity represented the emergence
of a continuing conflict in Indian politics over the best method of

influencing White policy.

If the action of the Durban NIC was at all

typical, few prominent Indians were willing to enlist the aid of Indian

workers for the large strikes and civil disobedience which erupted in 1913.
Instead, the Indian elite preferred to continue the tactics first used by
the NIC in 1894:

negotiations with White leaders, supplemented with

occasional petitions to demostrate depth of support.

In their debate with

Gandhi, the NIC joint secretaries blamed the loss of previous priviliges
on reaction against Gandhi by Whites, rather than any inherent hostility

toward educated, wealthy Indians.
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The accommodationist sentiment dominating the NIC in
1913 prevailed

without serious challenge until 1939.

During these years Indian politics

were characterized by disputes among rival leadership cliques
for control
of poorly organized provincial and national organizations.

Opposition to

the continued racial legislation of the White governments was
limited to

petitions and sending delegations to London and Delhi,

Passive resistance

as a political tactic was abandoned until resurrected by a new generation

of political leaders in 1939.

Commentary

If Gandhi's fitfull progress toward political mobilization of the

Indian masses was rejected by leading Indians of his time, his legacy of

resistance to anti-Indian legislation remained.

Aided by the pressures of

India and Britain, Gandhi had won victories against White opposition in

South Africa.

The example of passive resistance therefore remained to serve

as a rallying symbol for later, more radical Indians seeking formation of

a mass political movement in the 1940 's.

The move to a new militancy was spurred by the growing realization that
despite the Indian Relief Act and the Cape Town Agreement, White hostility

had not weakened.

What perhaps became obscured with the passage of time was

the extent to which Gandhi's successes had been due less to the strength of

his movement than to the intervention of Britain and India under the guise

of Imperial responsibility.

As South African independence increased, the

influence of Britain and India waned.

The victory of the Nationalist party

in 1948 destroyed the constraints of Empire loyalties and obligations on

South African racial policies.

Attempts by Indians to substitute the United

43

Nations as the protector of Indian status failed.

The new situation hastened for some Indian political
leaders an

important break with Gandhi's policy-fomation of an
alliance with the

African majority in a common struggle against the entire
apartheid system.
To gain credibility and influence with their African counterparts,
the new
leadership strived for what had eluded Gandhi;

a mass membership political

organization responding efficiently to the commands of its leaders.
first task was to defeat the accommodationist leaders.

Their
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CIWTER

III

THE REVIVAL OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE

White legislative actions in the 1930 's combined with
the failure of
the Cape Town Agreement demonstrated to many Indians
that they could not

expect to be gradually "uplifted" to equal status with the
White majority.
Gandhi's early victories against the tax and iinmigration
restrictions had

not been followed by any relaxation of the laws restricting Indian
economic

expansion and Indians had actually lost political rights.

Accommodationist

policy had failed because neither Indian nor White was willing to accept
the other's view of the proper place for Indians in South African society.

Dissatisfaction with the policies of the existing Indian leadership
gave a new generation the opportunity to gain control of the political
organizations.

The opportunity was not ignored.

Indian leaders such as

Yusef Dadoo in the Transvaal and George Naicker in Natal attempted to
change the character of Indian politics by creating political groups

supported and joined by the majority of Indians in each province.^

Their

goals were not limited to improvements in trading or housing, or even to

gaining equality for Indians.
superiority itself.

Dadoo and Naicker attacked the idea of White

They worked in alliance with Africans to end White

domination in South Africa by attempting to revive passive resistance.

To

accomplish this they had to overcome the tenacious opposition of the old
guard.

Throughout most of the 1940

's

the accommodationists fought Dadoo

and Naicker for control of the Indian political organizations.

Although

eventually defeated, the accommodationists founded new groups such as the
Natal Indian Organization (NIO) and retained an influence on Indian
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politics during the 1950

's.

A diversion must now be made to note the role of Indian
communists
shaping confrontationist policy.

in

Since 1924 the Communist party had worked

to gain non-White members, motivated by the belief that
common economic

interests of the White and non-White working class would
overcome the

barriers of racial separation.

Although this policy had failed to produce

a significant IVhite membership, the communists had gained
strength among

Africans and Indians in several areas of South Africa.

By the late 1930

's

the party had considerable influence among the Indian working class in
Natal,

Individual Indians, including Dadoo, had become prominent communists and

were serving on the party's central committee.
It is difficult to measure the exact impact of the Indian communists.

The communists sought to control the Indian Congresses, as well as the

...

2

other organizations participating in the Congress Alliance.
was never completely achieved.

This goal

At no time were either the TIC or NIC

controlled exclusively by communists, but it is probable that their
influence on policy exceeded their numerical strength.

This is an

assumption which cannot be proved, but evidence for it exists in the
experience of the Non-European United Front (NEUF)

Non-European United Front:

During the early 1940

's

No Compromise With Whites

Indian and other communists attempted to build

a non- racial political organization, the NEUF.

Although its immediate

imipact was insignificant, it is important because

adopted by the Congress Alliance in the 1950
an organization ahead of its time.

's.

many of its demands were
It was, in this sense,
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Fomed

in April, 1939, in Cape Town, the NEUF
contained "Communists,

Trotskyists and members of every racial group" except
the

Wliite."^

Its

first national council included Dadoo and H. A. Naidoo
of Durban, both of

whom were Indian communists preparing for leading roles in
the politics of
their respective provinces.

H. J.

Simons, a

fomer member of

the South

African Communist party, correctly described the importance of the
group:
"The seed of a grand non-racial alliance had been planted; but
seventeen

years were to pass before it bore fruit. "'^

The NEUF partisans brought to Indian politics militant goals and

militant tactics unused since the campaigns of Gandhi.

Emphasizing that

Indians would never be treated as equals by Wliites, Dadoo warned that

acceptance of voluntary Indian residential segregation, as advocated by

many accommodationist Indian leaders, would be followed by "industrial and
commercial segregation."

For Dadoo, the eventual Indian experience in South

Africa under White rule was mirrored in African locations throughout the
Union.

On this basic issue, Dadoo maintained:

"There cannot be any

question of compromise with the Government at any price. "^
The NEUF also pioneered perhaps the most radical innovation for Indian
politicians:

alliance with Africans.

remained strong in 1939.

Reluctance in seeking African support

Gandhi's son, Manilal Gandhi, wrote:

"the Union

Government's Indian segregation policy has noting in common with the policy

governing the African races. "^

Tlie

NEUF disagreed.

In February, 1941, the

Durban NEUF sponsored what was described as the first join African- Indian

protest meeting in the city's history.

African speakers subsequently joined

Indians at meetings protesting various racial laws both in Natal and the

Transvaal.

Indian NEUF members successfully promoted a resolution at the
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NIC's provincial conference, in 1944, supporting African
opposition to pass
laws and favoring the fomation of African trade unions.

Indians were prominent in the NEUF.

Dadoo served as secretary of the

Transvaal NEUF while seeking control of the TIC.

of the NEUF in Natal, with
treasurer.

C.

I.

II.

A. Naidoo was chairman

Amra as secretary and

D. A.

Seedat as

All were active in Indian political and labor organizations

during the 1940' s.

Other Indian members included

I.

A. Cachalia in the

Transvaal and George Singh, Ismail Meer, George Ponen, M.
M. M. Desai in Natal.

The NEUF

fomed

a

D.

Naidoo and

comon bond among these

1939 Indian NEUF members in Natal enlisted support for Dadoo'

s

men.

In

passive

resistance in the Transvaal, while Dadoo campaigned for Indian radicals in

conflict with the old guard in Natal.

g

The NEUF did not succeed in gaining a large membership and by the late
1940

's

it was abandoned by Indian communists who had secured leadership

positions in the regular political orgajiizations.

The goal of not

cooperating with White officials and of seeking cooperation with Africans
was continued within the framework of the Congress Alliance.

revolutionary goal, however, had not changed.

The

Instead of a non-racial

organization, communists worked for control of the African and Indian
Congresses, hoping to form

" a

revolutionary party of workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie, linked together
in a fim organisation, subject to strict discipline, and guided by a definite programme of
struggle ... It would be their task to develop
an adequate organisational apparatus, to conduct
mass struggles against race discrimination, to
combat chauvinism and racialism in the national
movement, to develop class consciousness in the
people, and to forge unity in action between the
oppressed peoples. "g
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In pursuit of these goals

,

Indian communists combined with militant

non-communists to cease apparently futile negotiations with
White authority.

Their first task was to gain control of the Indian
Congresses.

In the Transvaal:

Resistance Revived

The Transvaal Asiatics Land Tenure Act imposed mandatory
segregation
on the Indian community.

traditional leaders.

This gave Dadoo the issue needed to challenge the

The Act was a temporary measure passed to halt the

continued expansion of Indian trade and housing into White areas, pending
the report of a new commission studying the problem.

measure's temporary aspect.

Dadoo discounted the

He stressed that it reflected the desires of

Whites to permanently subordinate the Indian minority.

Residential and

commercial segregation was merely part of an overall system of discrimination

enforcing low wages, poor housing and limited educational opportunities.
These were popular issues and enabled Dadoo to divide the TIC by isolating
the established leaders.

Although his two resistance campaigns of 1939

and 1941 were unsuccessful in defeating offensive legislation, their

preparation demonstrated the extensive potential support available to the

new militants.
Dadoo laid his first challenge against the accommodationists at a

public meeting called by the TIC in March, 1939, to protest the Land Tenure
Act,

Against the wishes of the TIC's president, M. Valod, a motion to

begin preparations for a passive resistance campaign was approved.
chief proponent, Dadoo announced plans to
to coordinate the campaign.

forai a

As its

Passive Resistance Council

He left the possibility of including Africans

open, citing "the urgent necessity of cooperating with all other sections
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of the non-European community "^^
.

TIC officials either had not expected

the resolution to pass, or perliaps had not even known
it would be

introduced.

They were confused, the president denying the resistance

resolution to have passed, while the secretary, S. M. Nana, offered
his

resignation because his inability to defeat the measure indicated
a lack
of confidence in his policy.

Dadoo was urged to end his resistance plans

as they risked the loss of White support for Indian progress. "^"^

The

argument differed little from that used against Gandhi in 1913 and was

rejected by Dadoo.
Resistance leaders recognized the symbolic importance of linking
themselves to Gandhi.

A "veteral soldier" of Gandhi's resistance campaigns

who had been arrested fourteen times,

E. A. Asvat,

presided over several

rallies.

Dadoo was, however, less successful in obtaining Gandhi's personal

support.

Gandhi did not reject the idea of a campaign outright, but his

statement to Dadoo was equivocal:

"You have to suffer, not I, therefore

12

let God alone be your judge,"

Despite its ambivalence, the statement did

not deter the confrontationists from further preparations.
The Passive Resistance Council gained sufficient strength at rallies

throughout the Transvaal to be accorded separate status at an SAIC

executive meeting in May, 1939.

The TIC delegation was seated as the

official representatives of Transvaal Indians, but the resistors were

allowed to participate in discussions on the Land Tenure Act.
The meeting revealed the inability of the SAIC to affect Indian

provincial politics.

The Resistance Council delegation demanded that the

SAIC support the planned resistance and also order new elections for the

TIC executive.

The TIC officials opposed both requests.

The SAIC executive
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board ruled that since resistance plans were already in
progress, they could
be discussed at TIC meetings.

It also ruled, however, that since
passive

resistance was a question of principle concerning all South
African Indians,
a decision to begin a campaign could only be reached at a
formal SAIC

conference.

No decision was taken on the question of new elections for
TIC

officials, although it was admitted that elections had not been held
for
13

several years

The executive committee meeting proved meaningless

.

Although Dadoo had not received peimission to begin his campaign, his
prepatory efforts did not cease.

The TIC continued a futile opposition.

By July Dadoo 's support was great enough for him to announce that the

resistance campaign would begin on August

had declared their support.

1.

At least eleven TIC brandies

The tide was so strong that one branch that

had opposed resistance in Mardi changed its position in

July."*""^

Bridglal

Pachai's belief that the Passive Resistance Council was more popular than
the officials holding office in the TIC at the outbreak of World War II
15

seems correct.

The campaign was unexpectedly cancelled at this point.
reasons are not clear.

The exact

It was done, it seems, on the advice of Gandhi,

who informed Transvaal Indians that he would attempt to negotiate a
settlement of the Land Tenure Act with the Union government.

Indian

Opinion editorialized that Gandhi had intervened because the resistance
movement had become so strong that the Government might be willing to
-I

compromise.

/:

There is no record of any negotiations by Gandhi, but if

any were planned it is likely that the outbreak of World War II led to

their postponement.
The Resistance Council continued to exist as the Nationalist bloc of
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of TIC.

It continued to call for elections to remove the
TIC officials,

claiming that the many brancli resolutions in favor of
resistance demonstrated
a lack of confidence in the accommodationist leadership."'"''

The TIC

ignored the election demand.

Beyond the imprecise statement that the number of Indians
participating
in Transvaal politics increased and that a majority supported
the

resistance movement, it is difficult to assess the Nationalists' impact.
Records of increased enrollment in the TIC due to the Indian Nationalist

campaign do not exist.

The TIC had no registered membership in the 1930 's,

as all Indians were considered members on turning eighteen years of

age."'"^

Resolutions at branch meetings were taken by those present, and were often

decided by those who shouted the loudest in support of their favorite
resolution.

Much of the Indian Nationalists' success must be attributed

to their ability to mobilize their supporters to attend meetings.

White officials intervened indirectly in the Indian political quarrels

by recognizing the accommodationist leaders as the true representatives of
the Indian people.

Tliis \/as

important to moderates who argued that Indian

problems would only be solved by those willing to work with the Government.
The attitude of the Indian Penetration Commission, appointed in 1940 to

investigate the extent of Indian penetration into Wliite residential areas

typified the Government position during the 1940 's and 1950 's:

"We are informed that the Nationalist group,
though numerically stronger, is not an influential body, its rank and file being recruited
from the lower social and economic levels.
"^^

The Government's attitude was not immediately important to Dadoo, for his

policy was based on confrontation rather than cooperation.

If Whites did
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not, for the moment, consider his efforts
significant, that was not a
liability.

Political organizations must in the long run
produce results

to ensure continued support of all but the most
faithful adherents.

If

the Indian Nationalists "no -compromise" tactics
failed to improve the

Indian position, Dadoo's stature would decline while
that of the

accommodationists, with whom the Govemnent would discuss the
implementation
of programs, might grow.

The Government's ability to frustrate the confrontationists
was evident

when the Indian Nationalists attempted another passive resistance
campaign
in 1941.

years.

The immediate issue was renewal of the Land Tenure Act for two

Dadoo announced that the 1939 resistance plans had been suspended

only because Gandlii believed he could reach a compromise with the Government
Renewal, Dadoo maintained, proved compromise impossible.

Dadoo called for

the enrollment of volunteers, publication of regular resistance bulletins,

and public meetings to renew support.
Conditions were not as favorable in 1941 as in 1939.

The Land Tenure

Act remained unpopular, but most Indians appeared reluctant to confront the
Government during a time of war.

Dadoo himself was about to serve a prison

sentence for inciting Africans and Indians not to volunteer for military
service.

He had campaigned against Indian participation in the war for

nearly two years, while attempting at the same time to extend the support
of the Indian Nationalists.

In this latter task he had met with mixed

results, as seen in his effort to gain support among Indian youth and to

organize a boycott of the Indian Penetration Commission.

Early in 1940 Dadoo founded the Transvaal Indian Youth Organization
(TIYO) to enroll young Indians in an organization distinct from the TIC.
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TIC officials had made no special appeal to youth to
participate in their
organization, but Dadoo believed the youth were likely to
support his more

militant politics.

Members enrolled in the TIYO would be subject to

greater control and indoctrination than was possible in the poorly
organized
TIC and the registration fee and annual dues required would provide
the

Nationalists with a source of income not otherwise available.

The amounts

were small, but it was presumed that those willing to pay them would also
be willing to follow Dadoo 's political initiatives.

new group, including
Dadoo since 1939.

I.

22

Tlie

officers of the

M. M. Moosa, had been active with

Five hundred members were registered in the first three

months of recruiting,
confrontationists.

A Cachalia and

21

23

but the overall response disappointed the

During the next three months, only one branch was formed,

24

at Krugersdorp.

The TIYO did not play a role in the 1941 resistance.

Dadoo was less successful in attempting to organize a boycott of the
Indian Penetration Commission.

Participation would, he felt, continue the

policy of "compromise and cooperation" which had previously only weakened
25

the status of Indians.

Dadoo claimed that the Land Tenure Act violated

the "uplift" provisions of the Cape Town Agreement as it discriminated

against all Indians without regard to their educational or financial status.
He therefore condemned TIC officials for testifying.

26

The Commissioners

themselves were aware of the boycott but did not consider it effective as
27

their meetings were attended by a "large number of Indians."
Tlie

boycott probably never had much chance of success.

Sufficient

wealthy Indians were opposed to the Indian Nationalists to act as witnesses
for the Commission, while the Commissioners were only interested in the

testimony of Indians wealthy enough to purchase White properties.

Few of
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Dadoo's followers were in this category.

Despite these setbacks, at the beginning of 1941 Dadoo declared the

new year would intensify the struggle.

28

The 1941 resistance was formally

declared on April 27 at a public meeting of the Nationalist TIC.

Dadoo was

by now in prison and the leadership of the movement had temporarily passed
to

I.

A.

Cachalia.

His call to resist recognized the limited support likely

from Indians:

"In order not to embarass the Government during
the progress of the war, but at the saiiie time to
lodge its dignified protest against the humiliation and oppression which this Act subjects them
to, the Indian community hereby resolves to have
recourse to passive resistance, which shall be
individual in character and empowers the executive committee to direct the movement."
29
It is misleading to describe what followed in the next ten months as

either a "campaign" or a "movement".

Few Indians participated actively and

these were virtually ignored by the Government, to the consternation of
the resistors.

Four Indians began the activities by opening unlicensed fruit

vegetable stands in Johannesburg.

and

Despite the prominence of their location,

near Magistrate's Court and the City Hall, the law-breakers were not
arrested.

For several months they continued to break the law, disregarded

by everyone but an occasional photographer for the newspaper,

I ndian

Opinion

.

Government inactivity frustrated the resistors, who chided authorities
30

for not enforcing the law against them.

Illegal vending stands were opened

felt the
at several locations in Johannesburg where the Indian Nationalists

and railroad
police would be forced to act, including the main post office
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station.

These efforts to gain retaliation by the Government
continued

unsuccessfully throughout the resistance.
The "campaign" lingered till March, 1942, when the
Indian Nationalists

decided to support the Allied war effort.

Nationalists cited several

reasons for the failure of their movement to attract wide
support, including
the lack of arrests, the apathy of wealthy Indians, Government
censorship

of the White press which precluded extensive publicity abroad, and
the

reluctance of Indian sympathizers to actively participate."^"^

Resistance

leaders were especially disappointed by the poor response from young Indians.
S.

R. Mehd, "Commandant" of the small "Volunteer Corps", complained that:

Our struggle has been going on now for nine months
and yet we have only four or five persons to carry
it on.
In Europe you find universities empty because the youth have gone to the front to fight for
their country and their cause. Compare our position with their' s and you will find that we are
doing nothing to fight our own struggle."
32

It is difficult to compare the poor results of this campaign with the

enthusiasm evident in 1939.
suggested.

The most likely explanation has already been

Although opposition to the Land Tenure Act remained great, there

was strong sentiment to avoid embarassing the Government during the war with
Germany.

It should also be remembered that Dadoo was in prison throughout

the campaign and that the Government's refusal to make arrests would probably

not have continued if mass resistance tactics had been possible.

These

factors seem to have been realized by Cachalia when he issued his call to
resist.
Dadoo' s communist affiliations were no doubt responsible for his

decision to support the war after Gemany invaded the Soviet Union.

Although
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Dadoo did not explain why his switch occured nearly a year after
Russo-

Geman hostilities began, he aimounced

in March, 1942, that the war had

become a "people's war" against Fascism and deserved the support of South

Africa's non-White peoples.

33

After this declaration he was released from

prison.

Ending the resistance campaign and supporting the war aided the
Indian Nationalists in their immediate goal of gaining control of the TIC.

After several months of negotiations, they agreed to rejoin the TIC and were
given eighteen seats on its General Committee.

In accepting the merger,

TIC officials agreed to allow Nationalists to participate in the selection
of new leaders.

Within a year of the merger, the Nationalists demonstrated

their continued strength when Dadoo was elected the new TIC president.
Despite the failure of his resistance campaigns, Dadoo had gained a primary
goal:

by 1945 the confrontationists controlled the TIC.

In Natal:

Organize the Workers

Indian politics in Natal during the war years were similar to those
in the Transvaal, but were complicated by factionalism which appeared within

the NIC during the 1930'

s.

In 1933 Indians opposing a Government proposal

to re -colonize South African Indians abroad, left the NIC to found the

Colonial

Bom

and Settlers Indian Association (CBSIA)

.

The dissidents

disapproved of the willingness of NIC officials to study the scheme.

Although the plan was quickly abandoned by the NIC, the new organization
continued to exist.

Religious differences between the NIC and CBSIA

became pronounced in 1936 when the Moslem Agent -General for Indians in South

Africa married a Hindu woman.

Many Hindus left the NIC, some abandoning
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politics completely and others joining the CBSIA.

Tlie

NIC became a largely

Moslem organization in a predominantly Hindu community ."^^
Unity was temporarily restored by common opposition
to the Land Tenure

Act of 1939.

Members of the NIC and CBSIA approved a merger
of their

organizations into a new group, the Natal Indian Association
(NIA)

NIC officials, led by A.

I.

Several

.

Kajee, a Moslem businessman, balked at the

emergence of the NIA with the largest membership, but without
the support
of many prominent Moslem merchant leaders.

An Indian Nationalist faction within the NIA clashed with moderates
to detemine the proper response to the gro\%ing White demands for
residence

and trade restrictions.

In general, both NIC and NIA officials favored

voluntary restrictions on Indian residential expansion to prevent
Government- imposed sanctions, whereas NIA Nationalists opposed any

segregation, voluntary or compulsory.

As in the Transvaal, Nationalists

supported alliance with African organizations and many were members of both
the Communist party and the NEUF.

Dissension within the NIA was evident early in 1940, when a Nationalist

minority of the governing committee opposed a resolution pledging the NIA
to prevent Indians purchasing homes in Wliite residential areas.

division was clear:

The

Nationalist opponents of the resolution argued that

it implied acceptance of racial segregation; while proponents claimed

voluntary restrictions would lead to improved housing and municipal
37

services in Indian residential areas.

The NIA majority appointed a

committee to work with the Durban City Council in restricting Indian land
acquisition.

The dissenters included George Naicker, P. M. Harry,

Amra, D. A. Seedat and H. A. Naidoo.

C.

I.

All except Naicker were NEUF members

60

and communists.

There was conflict also over whether or not to support
the war effort.

Nationalists offered an amendment to a resolution supporting
the war to

withhold support until racial equality was established within
the aimed
forces and until the Govemment pledged itself to grant Indians
democratic
rights after the war.

Both measures received considerable support according

to Indian Opinion and it was difficult to tell which had passed.

The

NIA officially supported the war, despite the closeness of the result.
Despite these differences, the Nationalist group declared its intention
to remain within the NIA.

Nonetheless seven of their leaders were expelled

by the NIA esecutive in June, 1940.

39

The Nationalists then withdrew

support from the NIA and remained a separate bloc for three years, until
April, 1943.

During those years, Indian Nationalists travelled throughout

Natal attacking the NIA officials and organizing support in Indian trade
unions.

Although expelled from the NIA, Naidoo, Amra, Seedat and others
retained a political base through their membership in several unions.

At

union meetings they continued to denounce voluntary segregation and the
war.

For the first time in Indian political history, a systematic attempt

was being made to organize what the Indian Penetration Commission had
somewhat scornfully referred to as the "lower social and economic levels."

Between 1940 and 1942, for instance, Naidoo served as secretary of the
Natal Sugar Workers Union, vice-president of the Distributive Workers, and

secretary-treasurer of the Natal Teachers Union.

During these same years

he was also chaiman of the Natal NEUF and chairman of the Communist party's

Durban branch.

He was later elected a member of the Communist party's
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central conimittee.

Harry was similarly active, as chaiman
of the Iron

and Steel Workers Union, secretary of the Durban
Non-European Bus Employees

Union and organizing secretary of the Sugar
Workers Union.
he was a communist and NEUF member.

Like Naidoo,

The unions these men organized varied

in size from the 2,000 of the sugar workers to
the thirty employees of the

Maritzburg Standard Yoke and Timber Mills

No immediate effort was made

to bring these unionized workers into the NIA, but
the potential was

obvious
The Indian Nationalists had not yet developed a political
organization

within the NIA, but they dominated the trade union movement.

Thousands of

Indians were being prepared for political participation.

The strength of the Nationalist union leaders was demonstrated by their

successful opposition to the recruitment of Indian workers for the South

African armed forces.

Recruiting officers were driven from union meetings

by Nationalist speal<ers who empiiasized the unequal pay and dependent aid
given to Indian soldiers.

41

Nationalists also identified with their

Transvaal counterparts and the nationalist movement in India.

Meetings

were sponsored to protest Dadoo's imprisonment and the arrest of Jawaharlal
42

Nehru, leader of the Indian Nationalist Congress.

Government reaction to ant i -war activity in Natal was stronger than
to passive resistance in the Transvaal.

It attempted to stop Naidoo,

Seedat, and Amra from speaking publicly under its National Emergency

Regulations.

In October, 1940, for instance, seven Indians were arrested

for attending

an.

technicality.
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unlawful meeting, but were found not guilty on a
Seedat was himself convicted the following year under a

provision of the Security Code specifying that "No person shall utter a
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"^^
a subversive statement in the hearing of any other
person.

As in the Transvaal, the German invasion of Russia in
June, 1941,

eventually brought the Indian Nationalists in Natal to support
the war.
Six months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the
Nationalists

confimed their opposition to the war, though noting

a "radical change" in

its character and pledging their "sympathy" with the Soviet Union.

Nationalists admitted:

"The majority of our people are confused as to the

stand of the Nationalist Bloc."^^

position had changed.

The

V/ithin five months the Nationalist

In May, 1942, Naicker urged all Indians to support

the war, while asking the Government to end the anti- Indian policies which

had prevented full Indian cooperation in the past.^^
The reason for the change is not clear, though a few suggestions can be
offered.

Tlie

December statement continuing opposition to

tlie

while the Transvaal resistance campaign was still in progress.

war was made
Natal

Nationalists were travelling in the Transvaal as late as January, 1942,
speaking in favor of continued resistance.
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The change of policy came

about two months after the end of resistance in the Transvaal and Dadoo's

declaration that Worl War II had become a "people's war", rather than an
imperialist war.

It is likely that at least informal coordination between

politically sympathetic Nationalists existed in the two provinces.
Tlie

change in Indian Nationalist policy on the war removed one of the

issues responsible for the split within the NIA.

helped to remove the other.

The Union government

The report of the Indian Penetration

Commission upheld the Durban City Council's claim of increased Indian

penetration of White residential areas since 1940.

Legislation extending

the 1939 Land and Tenure Act to Durban was introduced almost immediately
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afterwards in the Union parliament.

Natal Indians were for the first time

to experience the restrictive property acquisition
of the Transvaal.

Tliis

threat again united Natal 's Indian organizations.
The Indian Nationalists announced that they were
willing to rejoin the

NIA to ensure unity against the new threat.

While hastening to capitalize

on the political opportunity the Union legislation provided,
the Nationalists

transfomed themselves into a new group:
of Action.

the Anti- Segregationist Committee

IVenty-five Indian organizations joined the Anti-Segregationist

Committee in April, 1943.

Seventeen were trade union, while the others

represented a variety of social and religious groups.

chaiman of the new group.

Naicker was elected

Billy Peters, a union organizer, was elected

vice-chairman.
The NIA in turn rescinded its 1940 resolution expelling the Nationalists,
adding several of them to its General Committee, among them Naicker, Ponen,
49
M. D. Naidoo and Peters.

organizLations

Tlie

NIA and NIC fomally dissolved their

in August, and reconstituted themselves

Indian Congress.

as the new Natal

For the first time, since 1932, Natal had a single

Indian political organization.
The Anti -Segregationists were a minority within the new NIC.

Tliey

immediately began efforts to increase their strength by drawing in their

union supporters.

"It is the duty of every trade unionist to give the

newly formed national organization every support and provide it with a mass
^'^

basis by enrolling members of his union,"

Seedat enhorted the workers.

Union meetings urged the NIC not only to seek repeal of the new Trading
and Occupation of Land Restriction Act, popularly known as the Pegging
Act, but also to work for return of the municipal franchise lost in 1924.
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Anti-Segresationists spoke not of negotiations, but
of an "immediate
offensive to regain lost rights.

The NIC:

"^^

The Accommodationists Defeated

The unity among Indian factions in the Spring and
Summer of 1943 was
shallow.

The dispute between accommodationist and confrontationist
tactics

broke out again at the NIC's first provincial conference
in 1944.

Conference

delegates struggled with the working of its resolution on the
Pegging Act,

with cooperation with yet another government commission as another
disruptive
if subordinate issue.

The accommodationists proposed a resolution condemning the Pegging

Act and suggesting voluntary segregation as an alternative to government
legislation.

Confrontationists won acceptance of an amended resolution

deleting acceptance of voluntary segregation, and asking the NIC to begin
a "mass campaign" with "mass meetings of protest" to gather a "mass

petition" for presentation to the government.

This resolution placed

the NIC on record as opposing any form of segregation.

At the same time,

it authorized large-scale political work among the Indian people to gather

signatures for the protest petition.

Petition gathering was not a radical

innovation, but the public campaign authorized was a departure from the

politics practised by NIC and NIA leaders since World War

I.

The

Ant i -Segregationists planned to solicit the signatures not only of the
Indian elite, but of the Indian workers as well.

If the Government did

not abandon segregation plans, and there was no reason to expect it would,
the groundwork for a new passive resistance campaign would have been

prepared.
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However, the Aiiti -Segregationists failed to pass
a resolution

condemning cooperation with the Government's new
Commission of Enquiry into

Matters Affecting the Indian Population of the Province
of Natal
compromise resolution was passed.

.

A

The NIC agreed to cooperate with the

Goverament investigation, but its representatives were
pledged to seek

restoration of the municipal and parliamentary franchise,
removal of

provincial immigration barriers

,

implementation of the Cape Town Agreement

extension of Indian educational facilities and increased housing and
civic
amenities in Indian residential areas.
All in all the results of the conference pleased the Anti-Segregationists
The NIC was committed to goals that, if implemented, would have ended the
Indians' status as second class citizens.

There was little hope of attaining

these goals, but this was anticipated by the militants who, like Dadoo,

believed the conference marked the 'TDeginning of the end of the policy of
compromise and defeatism.

"^^

The militants could not, however, control the actions of the moderates,

who secretely negotiated an agreement with General Smuts suspending the
Pegging Act in Durban, substituting a Licensing Board of Indians and Whites
in its place.

This was to supervise residential race patterns in Durban.

The "Pretoria Agreement" was opposed by the Anti-Segregationists.

They portrayed it as a violation of the NIC's resolution against

segregation and called for a new NIC election, promising to "build the
"^^
Congress up until it becomes truly representative of the people.

The

trade unions began a campaign against the Pretoria Agreement, several unions
.

passing resolutions condemning it as an acceptance of voluntary segregation.
NIC officials, in turn, responded that only eighteen of eighty-one
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members of the governing committee opposed the
Pretoria Agreement, defending
their actions as in accord with the general
instructions of the provincial
conference to continue negotiations with the
Goveimcnt on the problem of
Indian penetration.
committee.

They refused to hold elections for a new
governing
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The Anti-Segregationists were well prepared to contest
for control of
the NIC.

They had used their union organizations to increase the
membership

of the NIC from about 17,000 in 1943 to 35,000 in 1945.^^

Moreover, their

members were concentrated in Durban, while many supporters of the NIC
leadership were rural Indians.

no organizational support.

The moderates, by contrast, had virtually

Their records were kept in the home of an

official and funds were donated by a few wealthy individuals.^^

As an

elite lobby they were unequipped for a public struggle determined by the

numbers of adherents a faction could mobilize.
The NIC governing committee attempted to preserve its control by

postponing scheduled general meetings in September, 1944,

a:id

March, 1945.

The need for a new constitution; the inability of rural members to meet in
Durban; and the absence of reliable membership lists were cited as reasons
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for the postponements.

The general meeting might have been postponed

indefinitely had the Ant i- Segregationists not been willing to temporarily
abandon their confrontationist tactics.

In October, 1945, they obtained a

court order requiring NIC officials to hold new elections.

Seven thousand

Indians attended the meeting to elect forty-six Anti -Segregationist nominees
as a bloc to the governing committee.

Edward Roux, a former White

communist, claims that twelve of the new comitteemen were communists, but
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does not identify them.

Indian Opinion reported that the NIC had become
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"virtually the mouthpiece of the Indian trade unions
and the Communist
Party."63

The old NIC officials did not stand for
election.

many withdrew from it, though they retained control

In Durban,

of several NIC branches

in northern Natal.

George Naicker was elected president of the NIC.

The confrontationists

dominated Indian politics and could now prepare to test
their strategy
against the Government.

Their attitude had been clearly expressed in a

resolution proposed a year before their victoiy:

"This special general meeting of the Natal Indian
Congress repudiates and rejects the Pretoria Agreement and instructs the Committee of the Congress to
pursue a policy of uncompromising resistance to any
measure aimed at furthering segregation or discrimination against the Indian people."
64

Having gained control of both the TIC
control of the SAIC was inevitable.

said

NIC by 1945, confrontationist

New provincial representatives attending

the SAIC's biennial conference in 1947 elected Yusef Dadoo as president and

removed most moderate leaders from the executive committee.

Until the

banning of most Indian militants in 1963, the SAIC reflected the goals of
its provincial constituents.

Accommodationists might have retained more influence in the NIC if
their attempts to arrive at compromise on segregation through the Pretoria

Agreement had not been doomed by the refusal of the Natal Provincial Council
to agree to repeal of the Pegging Act in Durban.

If the Whites themselves

seemed unwilling to accept the possibility of voluntary Indian segregation,
it was clear that Indians could not make such a policy work.

The accommondationists did not abandon politics completely.

They
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fomed

the Natal Indian Organization (NIO) in 1947 and
continued opposition

to mandatory segregation, while emphasizing their
deteimination to work for

improved status for Indians only by "constitutional" and
"legitimate"
methods.

The NIO specifically opposed integration with the
White community,

noting that most Indians preferred to live in separate Indian
communities.^^
The NIO did not attempt to build a mass organization in
competition

with the NIC.

Membership was largely limited to businessmen seeking to

soften the impact of the 1950 's Group Areas legislation by accommodation

with the Government.

Although continually attacked by the NIC because of

its lack of popular support, its prestige among the Indian commerical

community grew as the confrontationists appeared unable to prevent the
imposition of legal segregation.

Commentary

The confrontationists appeared to have altered completely the

character of Indian politics between 1939 and 1945.

The NEUP had not

become an important political force, but its policy of uncorrpromis ing
resistance to segregation had been carried to Indian politics by several
of its Indian members.

The accommodationists were in disarray.

Passive

resistance had become an acceptable tactic for thousands of Indians, even
if it was not yet clear how many would join resistance activity.

In the

Transvaal resistance had already been attempted; in Natal it was about to
begin.

But if the Indian Nationalists had generated considerable popular
support, the depth of that support was not clear in 1945.

The Nationalists

had not captured control of formidable political organizations.

Indian

politics was based on street meetings and mass
rallies.

Accommodationist

leaders had not been interested in political groups
with registered

memberships, clear lines o£ communication with
subordinate units, and

regular financial contributions because these had
been unnecessary for their
purposes.

For the Nationalists, the task of organizing
their supporters

remained.

The Nationalists had won because they were willing to
capitalize on
the tremendous unpopularity of the mandatory segregation
laws by involving

the Indian people in politics on a massive scale.

If it is not certain

that a majority of Indians supported the Nationalists, it is
evident that

their opponents could not compete with them in the task of getting their
followers to political meetings.

The Indian militants were free to move their organization into
alliance with the African National Congress and to demonstrate the ability
of their confrontation strategy to defeat the segregation plans of the

Union government.

The Wliites, of course, could not be expected to suddenly

concede equality to Indians.

Under Naicker's leadership, the NIC

participated in two passive resistance campaigns and a third movement
requiring mobilization of the Indian people, but not active resistance.

These campaigns offered the prospect of either gaining or losing support,
depending on their success.

Their failure is the subject of Chapter

IV.
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the Communist party
1939 or 1940.
Like Dadoo, Naicker was also a doctor
who studied overseas, but he was not a member
of the Communist pa?ty.
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a^APTER IV
Tl-ffi

FAILURE OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE

If political leaders were able to plan their campaigns
as meticulously
as military tacticians organize their field exercises,
the new leaders of

the NIC might have paused after their victory and attempted to
consolidate

their strength.

The goals they had set at the NIC's first provincial

conference were ambitious, requiring a virtual capitulation by White

authority before they could be attained.

At the same time, the depth of

support for the confront at ionist position was unknown.

Thousands of new

members had been recruited, but little had been done to organize them.

Some

modest victory similar to that won by Gandhi might have consolidated Naicker's
strength and demonstrated that participation in political campaigns was a
useful endeavor that benefitted the Indian community.

Events pennitted none

of this.

White opinion was determined to enforce Indian segregation.

Natal 's

rejection of the Pretoria Agreement was followed by the Asiatic Land Tenure
and Indian Representation Act in 1946.

Briefly, the Act divided Natal into

"controlled" and "uncontrolled" areas.

Indian acquisition of land in

controlled areas was prohibited, unless a special exemption was received.
No restrictions were placed on uncontrolled areas, but these were already

largely Indian areas.

The act also prohibited Indians who had purchased

but not occupied land in White areas from occupying it after January 21,
1946.

In terms of the Act, Indians were, for the first time, granted

representation in the South African Senate and Assembly.

They were to elect

two Whites to the Union Senate and three to the Assembly and were to be
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directly represented in the Natal Provincial Council.

The NIC rejected

the representation provisions as discriminatory and
this part of the Act

was never implemented.

Naicker had won control of the NIC by promising to end the
ineffective
negotiations of his predecessors

.

It was now incumbent upon him to prove

that his leadership differed from those he had defeated.
the passive resistance campaign of 1946.

Natal, lasted nearly two years.

The result was

The campaign, limited largely to

It was the most ambitious Indian political

effort since Gandhi inadvertently aroused the masses in 1913.
In judging the effectiveness of the resistance movement, two criteria

might be applied:

the NIC's ability to change the laws opposed, and its

success in building an organization capable of mobilizing Indian

participants.

Both were declared goals.

The two goals were related.

Success in changing segregation laws would generate additional support.

A

viable organizational cadre would improve the NIC's ability to mobilize this
support before a campaign began.

1946:

The Failure of Resistance

The NIC's poor organization before Naicker assumed control has already

been discussed.

There was little scope for improvement in the few months

between October, 1945 and March, 1946, when the decision to prepare for
passive resistance was taken at the NIC's provincial conference.

A Joint

Passive Resistance Council was fomed with the TIC, but no acts of
resistance were attempted in the Transvaal until the campaign drew to a
close in 1948.

TIC volunteers did, however, participate in the Natal

movement and donated money to it.
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The Natal confrontationists recognized
that Indians there were,
despite
their opposition to the Land Tenure Act,
not yet ready for an extensive

resistance movement.

Naicker therefore began seeking Indian
support for

his militant goals in January, 1946.

He promised not only resistance
to

residential segregation, but also improved
housing and educational
facilities, free movement for Indians within South
Africa and a new

conference between India and South Africa.^
to Durban and Pietemaritzburg

.

Naicker limited his appearances

Much of Natal was not visited until events

had been underway for several weeks.

The neglected branches were far from

Durban and their support for resistance was anyhow doubtful.^
Resistance began in June, with several women crossing from the

Transvaal to Natal illegally.

For the next eighteen months the campaign

was limited to illegal occupation of selected property sites in
Durban.
Internal resistance was coordinated with diplomacy.

Delegations from both

the moderate and militant factions visited India, Britain and the United

States prior to the United Nations opening in October.

The main tactic of

the NIC was to force the arrest of numerous resisters for violating the Land

Tenure Act to engender international sympathy and support for the Indian

position in the United Nations Organization.

The idea of international

intervention was still inportant in Indian political strategy, for they hoped
that United Nations pressure would eventually force South Africa to repeal
3

segregation laws.
The resistance strategy, then, was designed for extensive visibility
abroad.

The Government was only partially cooperative.

Arrests were not

made for violating the new Pegging Act, but for contravening the Riotous
Assemblies Act or for simply trespassing on Government property.

Resisters
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were treated not as political opponents but as
criminals.

Tliere is

no

evidence this reduced the nonbcr of Indian
volunteers, but it certainly

produced less dramatic news accounts.
To counteract this, the NIC in August opened
a second resistance center
in the Wentworth district of Durban.

Volunteers now violated the

segregation law by occupying previously unoccupied land
of their own in
the White residential area.

resisters.

Again, the Government did not oblige the

None were arrested until

after the United Nations session had

considered the South African question in October.

Once again, the movement

failed to receive the publicity it desired.
As in the Transvaal in 1941, the lack of arrests led resistance leaders
to taunt the Government.

Tlie

NIC sent letters to the Minister of the

Interior and the Durban police commandant setting out current violations of
the law and asking whether the failure to arrest implied that the Government

did not intend to enforce its own legislation.^

No arrests were made

despite this provocation.
In addition to favorable publicity, the resistance strategy also required

high Indian participation and unity within the Indian community.

Divisiveness

or apathy would weaken the NIC's claim for international support as the

representative of Indian opinion.

Despite the wide opposition to the Land

Tenure Act, complete unity was not attained.
The news that A.

I.

Kajee, former president of the NIC, had held private

talks with General Smuts about a resolution of the segregation problem

disconcerted some Indians abroad.

Sorabjee Rustomjee, an NIC official

seeking support for resistance in India, complained that such negotiations

weakened his claim to represent all South African Indians and cast doubt on
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the necessity for passive resistance. 5

Support among Indians was also not as
widespread as resistance leaders

had anticipated.

George Singh, a union leader and a
resister who also was

chaiman of the NIC Working Committee, was distressed
by the lack of active
participation two months after events began:
y

"man people do not know how vitally, how
directly
and viciously this Act hits our people,
probably
because they have not yet come into direct conflict
with its provisions. It has been designed in
a way
that no Indian will escape its provisions
for long.
We cannot and must not wait for the stage when
we
are personally hit. Now is the time for action "
6

Singh's complaint reflected a common political problem:

relatively few

people are motivated by principle alone; most must be directly
affected by
the conditions against which they are urged to protest,
the more so when the

consequences of protest may involve imprisonment and financial loss.

The

Land Tenure Act affected most seriously those Indians capable of purchasing
land in White areas for either residential or investment purposes.

It did

not immediately affect the majority of less affluent Indians who had no

plans for either living or investing outside existing Indian ghettos.

Most of the active resistance participants were Indian professionals
dissatisfied in principle with segregation, workers following the lead of
ideologically motivated union officials, and a few mercliants angered by
limits placed on their commercial expansion.

were young Indian

workers, many unemployed.

from NIC branches in working class areas.

More than half the resistors
7

This was reflected in support

By December, 1946, for instance,

the Clairwood branch had furnished approximately twenty percent of all

volunteers and raised some LI, 000 in contributions.

The branch established
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a canteen to feed resisters and a welfare department
to care for the

children of the resistance volunteers
The number of volunteers increased steadily from June
until the opening

of the United Nations session in October.

The United Nations resolution

on the South African question was ambivalent.
of Indians in South Africa

hamed international

It noted that the treatment

relations between India and

South Africa and urged South Africa to treat its Indian population
in accord

with the United Nations Charter.
accept

The South African Government did not

the implied criticism of its Indian policy and announced its

intention to continue enforcing the Land Tenure Act.

q

The failure of the United Nations resolution to alter the Government's

segregation policy all but collapsed the resistance movement.

During the

first five months, approximately 1,500 resisters had been arrested; during
the remaining fifteen months of the campaign, the number of additional

arrests was only about five
Tlie

hundred.''"'^

failing response caused NIC officials to convene an emergency NIC

conference to consider ways of continuing the movement.

branches sent representatives

.

Only ten of thirty

The remedies suggested reveal that

organizational preparation before resistance began had been limited.

The

delegates agreed to begin a "door-to-door" canvass for funds and volunteers,
to attempt a "proper area distribution" of resistance literature and to

appeal for continued support from trade unions.

11

•

By inference, union

support for resistance was weakening and the NIC had never conducted

extensive canvassing of the Indian community to gain the participation of
those who were not already members.

Like their predecessors, the NIC

militants relied primarily on public meetings, parades, and pamphlets both
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to gain recruits and to propagandize.

The proposed remedies were not especially
successful.

Two months

after the special conference, The Guardian
continued to report that

"resistance had slackened somewhat and there had
been a resurgence of

political cleavages.

H. A, Naidoo

.

promised that resistance would

resume "as strong as ever," but this required
favorable action by the

United Nations in 1947 and "effective collaboration
between the Nonhuropean peoples."

12

Neither was forthcoming.

Although the NIC's regular provincial conference in June,
1947, approved
continued resistance, the movement did not recover.

By November, the

Government had ceased arresting trespassers on the main "resistance
plot"
of Government -owned land in Durban.

A second NIC emergency conference

sought to revitalize the campaign by expanding it to include violation of
the Immigration Act of 1913, which forbade the movement of Indians between

Natal and the Transvaal without a pennit.

The decision had little effect.

During the first three months of 1946, only fifty Indians entered the

Transvaal illegally.

After a period of inactivity, police arrested the

leaders, Dadoo and Naicker.

The rest were deported to Natal.

13

Resistance had clearly lost its ability to attract extensive

participation by the Indian people, although a handful of dedicated
volunteers continued to maintain the facade of a campaign.

The defeat of

General Smuts' United party in the parliamentary elections of 1948 offered
the NIC leaders an opportunity to end resistance, while lessening the

implication that it had been a failure.

The Join Resistance Council

announced in June, that since the government responsible for passage of the

Land Tenure Act was no longer in office, the campaign would be suspended

81

pending detemination of the new Nationalist party
government's attitude
toward Indian segregation.^^

The Nationalist goveiment refused to
meet

with the NIC and reaffimed its support of racial
segregation, but the
resistance movement was not resumed.
The resistajice movement had not achieved its
immediate goal of forcing
the repeal of the Land Tenure Act.

It had also failed to benefit from the

enthusiasm evident during the campaign's early stages.

Although a membership

of 35,000 was still claimed in 1948, the NIC had not
formally recruited any

new members since 1945.^^

Naicker doubted the reliability of many volunteers

who had joined the movement out of "frustration and hope" rather than
any
real practical understanding" of the difficulties of the struggle.

He

admitted that resistance had failed to create sustained support from the
people.

At the campaign's end, the NIC had "lost support. "^^

Aftermath of Resistance:

Unity with the ANC

Confrontationists were more successful in achieving a strategic goal
that did not require the immediate approval of the Indian community.

In

March, 1947, Dadoo and Naicker joined with Dr. A. B. Xuma, president of
the ANC, to sign a joint statement of principle and pledging cooperation in

their future political activities.

The common goals were similar to those

of the NEUF and placed the organizations in the "no- compromise" position

advocated by Dadoo since 1939.

The African and Indian Congresses agreed to

work for:

--"full franchise" regardless of race
—"equal economic and industrial rights and opportunities"
--"the removal of all land restrictions against non- Europeans"
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the abolition of pass laws
against the
African people, and the Provincial
barriers
against the Indians"
--"the removal of all discriminatory
and oppressive legislation from the Statute Book"
.

.

.

17

Few Africans had participated in the 1946
resistance, either before or
after the Dadoo-Naicker-Xuma pact. Many were
reported to have volunteered,
but only a few were actually used.^^

Nevertheless, a beginning had been

made in achieving an alliance that confrontationists
considered vital to

their eventual success against White racial
legislation.

It was, said Y. A.

Cachalia in the Transvaal, a "first step" tov/ard the
eventual liberation of
all non -Whites.

Four years after the end of the Natal resistance,
the

Indian and African Congresses began their first major
joint campaign, in

defiance of several pieces of racial legislation
implementing the

Nationalist party's apartheid policy.

1952:

If
the 1940

tlie

's

Leaders Without Followers

segregation legislation introduced by the Smuts government in
had been expected to arouse Indians to mass political action, the

legislation of the Nationalist government should have been an even more
effective stimulant.
"peg

tlie

The Group Areas Act of 1950 was designed not only to

existing situation", but also to "remove the penetration (of Wliite

areas) which has already taken place. ""^^

dislocation from areas declared

IVliite,

For Indians this meant possible

African or Coloured.

well as residential relocation was anticipated.

accommodation with the Government had decreased.

Commercial as

The prospects for

Implementation of apartheid,

according to one Nationalist representative, was a case of life and death."

20
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Congress politici^ans had been relatively
free to conduct their
political work under tlie Smuts government.
Tlie Nationalists,
however,
resolved to curb the activities of groups
which advocated the end of Miite
supremacy. Their fxrst step in this
direction was passage of the
Suppression
of CoHMunism Act in 1950. Tlie new law
empowered the Minister of Justice to

ban from politics individuals or organizations
believed to be aiding the
aims of communism.

Tlie

Communist party dissolved itself and many
fomer

communists were subsequently bamied from membership
in other political
organizations.

Non-communists who had been allied with the
communists were

also subject to banning.

Ihe Suppression of Communism Act was used
to ban

several Indian militants during the 1950
communist, and Naicker, who was not.

's,

Tlie

including both Dadoo, who was a

impact of this on Indian political

organizing will be considered later.
To combat these and other apartheid laws, African and Indian
leaders

fomed

in August 1951, a Joint Plajining Council to coordinate their
political

work.

The Council announced that if the Government did not respond
to an

ultimatum to repeal the offensive legislation, the Indian and African
Congresses would begin a nation-wide civil disobedience campaign.

A

movement on a grand-scale was envisioned:

"A substantial form of mass action will be necessary which will gradually embrace larger groups
of people, permeate both the urban and rural areas,
and make it possible for us to organize, discipline
and lead the people in a planned manner."
21

The Council statement revealed that the proposed campaign was designed
to accomplish niore than the repeal of a few specific legislative acts.

Congress leaders also planned to expand their organizations, giving them a
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greater ability after the campaign's conclusion
to "organize, discipline,
and lead the people."

Additional

cajiipaigns

were considered necessary even

if the Defiance campaign was successful,
for the ultimate objective was

political equality with lVliites.22
Tlie

Defiance campaign, conducted between June, 1952
and April, 1953,

received considerable international publicity.

By its conclusion, more

than 8,500 people had been arrested throughout South
Africa for breaking a

variety of laws.

Approximately 300 of these occured in Natal.

Detemination

of the exact number of ijidividuals arrested is difficult, for
in many cases
the

saJTie

people were arrested more than once.

turnout in Natal are considered below.
by stressing

tlie

The reasons for the poor

The NIC solicited Indian participation

dangers to Indian homes and businesses from the population

resettlement required by the Group Areas Act,

Debi Singh, general -secretary

of the NIC, visited branches to educate Indians to the possible effects of

Group Areas "so that

tliey

can be mobilized" for resistance.

His speeclies

also emphasized the necessity of working with other non-Wliites against all
23

aspects of apartheid.

Although Indians were expected to react enthusiastically against the
Group Areas, the NIC was faced with an important tactical disadvantage

similar to that of 1946.

Most Indians already lived among groups of fellow

Indians and it was not yet clear in 1952 which Indians might be forced to
move.

No group areas were to be demarcated until after government study

groups had held hearings in the concerned area.

At these hearings, Indians

faced with relocation were invited to offer their objections and submit
alternate plans

.

Again Indians had to chose between the two alternatives

that had always existed when segregation legislation was introduced:
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"cooperation in the hope of securing some concession,
and non- cooperation,
either in an attempt to defeat the plajis, or
as a matter of principle. "^^
The resistance of 1946 had not succeeded in
defeating the Land Tenure
Act.

Indian accommodationists in the Natal Indian
Organization now argued

that new defiance would have equally little ijnpact.

Instead of resistance,

they believed Indians should offer their own plans for
the fomation of

group areas, in an effort to minimize population moves.

Since few meetings

of the Group Areas Boards had as yet been held, it was unclear
that

accommodation would be a less effective policy than confrontation.

NIC:

Organization in Decay

In addition to divided Indian opinion, planners of the Defiance

campaign were burdened with
NIC.

a:iot]ier

serious problem:

the condition of the

At the close of the 1946 resistance, the NIC had claimed nearly thirty

active banches.

By the beginning of 1952, the organization had deteriorated

to such an extent that the general -secretary could cite only two branches

that were functioning "fairly regularly".

25

The decline was not attributed

directly to any political defeats or to competition from the NIO, but simply
to a "lack of political activity" since 1948.

Branch inactivity was

reflected at the provincial level, where absences were frequent among branch
representatives to the NIC Working Conmittee.

Several branches were not

represented at all.

With such an organization, the NIC was poorly prepared to "mobilize"
anyone.

It had leaders enough, but their following, to whatever extent it

still existed, was comatose.

Before implementing the Joint Planning

Council's plan to "organize, discipline and lead the people" the NIC had
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first to reviatalize itself.

Hiat its success in so doing was
li:nited

provides one answer to what Leo Kuper temed
the "remarkable" lack of
Indian

participation in the Defiance campaign. ^6

a second answer may have been

the absence of an immediate threat from the
Group Areas Act.

Finally, the

absence of branch organization meant the NIC had
done little to implement
its alliance with the ANC.

The NIC did not begin the Defiance movement in Durban
until more than
two months after the national resistance had started.

Less than 300

resistors were recruited in the subsequent eight months of
the campaign.
The limited activity allowed Natal police to ignore much of
the protest,
thus depriving the NIC of the publicity and sympathy frequent
arrests might

have generated.

One group of twenty resistors at Durban's main railway

station was unable to attract policy attention until it left

tlie

individuals removed the ambands identifying them as resisters.

station and

They were

then arrested for curfew violations.
The Defiaiice campaign was effectively halted by the Government's response
to riots in East London and on the Rand.

political agitation.

The violence was blamed on Congress

The Government was able to gain passage of two new

laws- -the Criminal Laws Amendment Act and the Public

Safety Act--whicli

provided greater penalties for those advocating or financially aiding civil
disobedience.

The number of volunteers for resistance fell quickly and in

April, 1953, Congress leaders decided to end the campaign.
Tlie

29

impact of the Defiance campaign on the NIC was mixed.

The general

secretary reported that the nunber of active branches rose to seventeen during
the latter half of 1952 and that attendance at Working Committee meetings

improved.

Most members of the Executive Committee, on the other hand, did
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not treat the campaign as a serious political
event.

Decisions of that

committee were carried out by a "few willing
members", while most did not

"throw their full weight in the struggle".
The extent to which fifteen branches were
actually moved from their

lethargy is also questionable.

During the first two months of 1953, the

reactivated branches were asked to conduct membership
drives to capitalize
on enthusiasm generated during the movement.

existed, its duration was apparently short.

Wliatever enthusiasm had

According to the general-

secretary's report to the 1953 provincial conference, only three
acted "with
any amount of consistency."

Comparison of the NIC's political effort in 1946 and 1952 leaves only
the conclusion that the strengtli of the NIC was declining.

The number of

resistance recruits had fallen from 2,000 during the 1946-1948 events to less
than three hundred in 1952.

number of Africans.

The latter figure includes an undetermined

Even allowing for the shorter duration of the 1952

Defiance campaign, the ability of the NIC to mobilize political activists
was not indicative of an organization claiming mass support.

Despite the

rhetoric of mass politics, NIC militants committed to the confrontationist

policy remained an elite group within the Indian community.
The prospects for a stronger organization after 1942 were less

auspicious than after the 1946 resistance.
Laws

With passage of the Criminal

Amendment Act and Public Safety Act, the Nationalist government had

given notice of its determination to eliminate the non-parliamentary

opposition to its apartheid policy.

Tlie

Defiance campaign was the last

planned in relative freedom by Congress officials.

After 1952, the

leadership was increasingly subject to bannings and arrests that limited
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their participation in politics.

Under those limitations, Indi^ui
radicals

began to prepare for their final large-scale
auiipaign with the ANC,

Preparations for the Congress of the People in
1954 and 1955 emphasized the
defects present in 1952.

1954:

"llie

People Shall Govern"

Following the Defiance campaign, the Indiaii Congresses
shared in the

public optimism voiced by Congress Alliance spokesmen.

Neman

Levy's

conclusions are typical:

campaign liad been from its inception a popular
mass movement against oppression.
It had involved
considerable hardships and sacrifice. Congress had
grown by leaps imd bounds, matured in the process
ajid emerged strongly on the offensive.
A vital
unity had been achieved amongst tlie Indian, Africaii
and Coloured elements of tlie population, and the
eyes of the world--and of white South Africans- -had
been open to African aspirations."
"Tlie

31

The SAIC claimed that

tlie

campaign had increased "the political

consciousness of the non-wliite people"

aiid

established the Congresses as

"the true spokesmen of the majority of the people of South Africa."
llie

32

private evaluation of the national Congress leadership was more

pessimistic.

The National Action Committee (NAC)

Planning Council, reported to the ANC

aiid

,

successor to the Joint

SAIC in December, 1953, on the

"regrettable state of affairs whicli has developed since the Defiance

Campaign."

According to the NAC, activities to increase mass support had

virtually ceased during 1953, due in large part to the banning of Congress
leaders and the discouragement of increased penalties for breaking apartheid
laws.

Inactivity had led to "the growth of confusion, vacillation,
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misunderstanding, disagreements and diversionary
tactics" within the enti re
Congress movement. ^-^

To halt this decay, the NAC proposed a new campaign,
based on "concrete
conditions" affecting Congress members and potential
recruits.

It was hoped

that new political activity would renew the
organizational strength of the

Congress Alliance members, and in particular make the
branches "live and
active units".

To accomplish this and at the same time avoid the new criminal

penalties, the NAC recommended adoption of a proposal from Professor
Mathews, chaiimaji of the Cape ANC.

Z.

K.

Mathews had suggested that the Congresses

sponsor an assembly of representatives for all South African racial groups
to draft a "Freedom Charter."

the apartheid system.

The Charter would outline an alternative to

The NAC envisioned no direct confrontation with

Government authority in preparing for the assembly, although the Freedom

Qiarter accepted at the Congress of the People in June, 1955, was not
compatable with IVhite opinion:

" Every man and woman shall have the right to vote
for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies whicli
malce laws; All people shall be entitled to take part
in the adninistration of tlie country; Tlie rights of
the people shall be the same, regardless of race,
colour or sex; All bodies of minority rule, advisory
boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by
democratic organs of self-government."

34

The NAC's proposal was adopted within three months by all Congress

Alliance members.

Representative of the ANC, SAIC, COD,

a:id

SACPO selected

a joint planning committee in March, 1954, to plan the campaign.

The Congress of the People was the most ambitious project the Congresses
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had yet devised.

In addition to the public goal of adopting
the proposed

Freedom Charter, Congress leaders were attenipting to create
a permanent
political organization separate from that of the national
Congresses.

The

planning committee was dianged to a National Action Council of
the Congress
of the People, with an equal representation from each of the
Congresses.
The eventual goal was establishment of similar multi-raical
committees at
the provincial level.

Eventually it was hoped they would exist "on a town,

suburb, factory or street basis."
Tlie

provincial committees were the key to the plan.

They were to

convene provincial conferences to inaugurate the COP movement.

Local

committees established after the provincial conferences were expected to

conduct extensive local propaganda.

Tlie

Congresses themselves were expected

to provide the major initial support for the new organizations, but membership

was not limited to those already enrolled in a Congress unit.
The wealv link in this plan, of course, was the Congress movement itself.

Where Congress brandies were strong, it was anticipated that the new COP
organizations would be strong.

would be weakest.

Where Congress was weak, the new organization

The NAC recognized that the poor organization and finances

prevalent among many Congress units prevented the use of paid organizers
during the can^aign.

Mad such organizers been available, they would have

been sufficiently occupied restoring Congress itself.

As an alternative,

it was lioped that initial enthusiasm against apartheid and for the proposed

Freedom Charter would attract "thousands of new active workers" to the
Congress movement who would voluiiteer their time to organize additional
recruits.

Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC, called for 50,000 of

these "Freedom Volunteers" as the nucleus of the new organization.

Congress
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appeals emphasized that Freedom Volunteers were
being recruited not to

begin a new Defiance cainpaign, but to work among

tlie

people creating mass

support for the Congress movement.

Within the NIC, opposition to the COP plans existed.

Campaign

preparations were criticized because the NIC organizations
and finances were
weak, because the general goal of adopting a "freedom"
charter was too

vague to attract Indian support and because the United
Nations Declaration
of Human Rights made adoption of a Freedom Charter redundant.

Confrontationists answered their critics by claiming that the COP
campaign

would strengthen multi-racial opposition to apartheid and provide national
coordination of individual Congress campaigns against different aspects
of
apartheid.

39

Naicker maintained the canpaign was important because it would

test the ability

aiid

develop the self-confidence of new leaders.

The

formation of COP groups at all levels would also increase the political

education of participants, eliminating the "political immaturity" that

Naicker said had plagued earlier campaigns.
Tlie

National Action Council planned the campaign to proceed in three

distinct phases.

Congress organizations would first establish the provincial

and local COP committees

.

The local committees would next sponsor meetings

to determine the grievances of the people and explain how implementation

of Congress goals could alleviate

would be elected.

tliem.

Finally, delegates to the COP

The first phase was scheduled to end by January, 1955;

the second by February.

Delegate selection would occur soon after.

Government bannings of Congress leaders prevented close adlierence to
the sclicdule.

During October and November, nearly the entire NIC

execii.tive

commj
littee and secretariat was banned from political activity under the
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Suppression of Communism Act.

Forced to resign from the NIC were
George

Naicker, Debi Smgh, M. P. Naicker, the
organizing secretary, Ismail Meer,
J. N. Singh and Fatima Meer.

Naicker regarded the bannings as a
"grave-

setback to the COP work.^^
The precise gravity of the bannings on the COP
preparations is

impossible to estimate, but during 1955 the campaign
was marked by a lack
of communications between the NAC and its provincial
counterparts and a

failure to meet the schedule established.

Wlien

Natal was repeating an

"urgent" request to the NAC for posters and bulletins to
publicize the
COP, the NAC was on the same day infonning provincial
organizations that

they had to prepare their own publicity materials

."^^

IVhen

the NAC was able

to supply a leaflet "of great importance", local organizations
were asked

to duplicate it for distribution because the NAC had no funds.

Throughout

the campaign, queries were common between provincial and national
headquarters

and provincial and local units seeking to determine progress in recruiting

volunteers, educating

tlie

public, and raising money.

Few were answered.

By Marcli, 1955, the NAC had as yet received so few demands for inclusion
in the Charter that two additional months were allowed for canvassing the

people.

Anticpating further delays, the date for election of delegates was

postponed indefinitely:

elections could be held "until very late."^^

Supporters of the campaign were becoming disillusioned.

New Age warned

Congress leaders that although the organizational hopes had not been met,

additional delay would dissipate any enthusiasm already generated:
"indefinite delays and procrastinations have the most harmful effects upon
the people's movements, leading to a loss of enthusiasm and confidence in
the movement and its leaders.

"'^^
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Tlie Ne^v

Age criticism was justified in Natal.

Provincial leaders

were unable to organize the elaborate structure
originally anticipated by
the NAC.

As late as May, 1955, one month before the
COP convened, the Natal

COP committee requested organizers to "please keep
in touch" with the Durban

Secretariat and to "let them know what you are doing, how
many meetings you
are calling, how many area drives you have made, how many
delegates you have

organized."

47

In the final days before the COP, organization
was abandoned

in favor of spontaneity:

'HVlio is to organize all this? --You are.
Start
by yourself talk to your neighbors and your workmates.
Organize a little meeting for them. Then
get them to do the same in other places.
But
You Do It: Wlien is this to be done? Now, Right
Away, Today. There is no time to lose. Delegates
have to be elected; money for their fares collected.
So do it now I"
.

.

;

.

.
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Tlie

COP campaign in Natal eventually produced 300 delegates.

The

infusion of new supporters into the Congress Alliance did not materialize.

According to the NAC, the number of local committees formed to conduct the
COP drive was "negligible," although it believed that some existing Congress

organizations had been strengthened.

49
Tlie

lack of an efficient organization

before the campaign began must be considered an important reason for its
failure.

Volunteers that were recruited to canvass for the COP in mid-1954

were not organized, if at all, until April of 1955.

In the interval, many

lost interest.

NIC:

The Decline Continues

As in 1952, the NIC in 1954 was ill-prepared to provide leadership of
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a mass campaign.

Tlie

SAIC's optimistic interpretation of the
Defiance

campaign had not been translated into new strength for
its Natal affiliate.
The NIC general-secretary reported to the 1954 provincial
conference

only 450 new members had been added during the past year.

The increased

membership was distributed among just five branches, Overport,
Merebank, Mayville and Bellair.

tliat

Sy-denliam,

Inactive brandies at Clare-I-state and

Verulam had been revived, but two others had become inactive in
1953.

At

Glencoe, the branch chaimian and secretary had refused to support the
NIC's

complete opposition to the Group Areas Act.

Durban branches, where tne

Naicker militants had originally been strongest, were criticized for leaving
problems for the solution of provincial leaders, with subsequent inactivity
by the branches themselves

.^^

The NIC's condition might have been a prototype for the NAC's worry
over the "regrettable state of affairs" in

tlie

Congress movement.

Attendance

at Working Committee meetings followed the general branch inactivity.

Its

work was termed "disappointing" because poor representation prevented
provincial leaders from communicating regularly with branch officials and
"hammering out the programme of Congress

..."

The Secretariat and

Executive committees, dominated by former Ant i -Segregationists and Nationalists

had met frequently but their members were talking primarily among themselves.
Without a functioning Working Committee, executive decisions could not be

passed to the branches.

^"^

Once again, the NIC was faced with the necessity

of revitalizing its own membership before it could be

expected to contribute

to the COP campaign.

The decay of the NIC organization had persisted despite its increased

opposition to the Group Areas Act.

At meetings throughout Durban, NIC
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speakers charged that the City Council's proposed
resettlement scheme was

designed to eliminate Indimis from the city.

A common warning was that

at

least 100,000 Indiajis would be forced to move and that
the Indian community

would lose 9t million in property. 52

Nevertheless, the NIC could not

maintain a united front among the Indians.
opponents in the NIO did not accept

Its old accommodationist

total opposition to Group Areas and

were submitting alternative proposals to the Land Tenure Boards.

The Overport

NIC branch reported that Indians were "rushing to purchase land in areas

designated by the City Council for Indian settlement
Tlie

^"^
.

efforts of the NIC to defeat or delay the final determination of

Group Areas was tlireatened when Land Tenure Boards in Natal began to exclude
its representatives from meetings on the grounds that the NIC was not an

"interested party", but sought only to prevent the Boards from functioning.^^
The NIC cliallenged the exclusion in court, but at the start of the COP

campaign its prospects for defending the Indian community against what many

seemed to regard as an inevitable process must have been in doubt.
The NIC itself was not strengthened by the COP campaign.

Between

August, 1954 and May, 1955, the Natal Action Committee was able to raise

only L 70 for COP work.

At the end of the campaign, the NIC was forced to

supply virtually all funds for the transport of delegates to the COP, some
L275 of L315.

L2,000.^^

At the movement's end the NIC was in debt for more than

Instead of announcing a renewal, the general -secretary 's report

to the NIC provincial conference in 1956 reported that since the COP, brancli

activity had undergone a "steady decline" and that no meaningful estimate
of active NIC members was possible.

Of the fifteen branches remaining

active, most were considered to be "in a serious state organizationally"
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and virtually none were soliciting new members.

Postscript:

One Million Signatures Campaign

Congress leaders made a final attempt to capitalize
on the publicity

received from the Congress of the People.

National executives of

tlie

Congress Alliance agreed to begin a follow-up campaign
to collect the

signatures of one million apartheid opponents by the
first anniversary of
the COP, June, 1956.

To coordinate the drive, the COP's National
Action

Council was continued as the National Consultative Committee
(NCC) and the
titles of the provincial Action Councils were similarly
altered.

Tlie

campaign was declared without the prior approval of provincial
Congress

conferences because the national executives believed their subordinate
units would not begin to work for signatures quickly enough.^''

New Age

noted that "to readi its goal, workers would have to gather signatures at
the rate of "3,000 per day, every day, beginning tomorrow. "^^

The NCC hoped to use the signature drive to complete the work of the
COP campaign.

Workers were expected to coordinate their activities with

local issues such as Group Areas to explain how achieving the goals of

Freedom Charter would solve

tlie

"everyday" problems of the people.

tlie

At the
CO

same tune, new Congress recruits were anticipated from the canvassing.

Natal was assigned a quote of 150,000 signatures.

Considering the limited organization activity in Natal during the COP
movement, it is difficult to believe Congress leaders expected the new project
to succeed.

Nevertheless the public posture was optimistic.

The SAIC

announced its intention to gather the signatures of all adult Indians;

Naicker maintained the goal could be acheived "if every Congressmen sets
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out to get these signatures with energy and
enthusiasm and convinced of
the success the signature campaign must
achieve.

exhortations, the campaign failed.

Despite these

Congress groups in the Transvaal

collected 50,000 signatures from a target of
450,000.

No figures were

reported from the other provinces, but the NCC
doubted that more than
50,000 had been gathered from Natal, the Cape province
and the Orange Free

State combined.
Tlie

poor response from the provinces prompted the NCC to
speculate

about whether or not it was "really regarded as necessary
in the eyes of
the constituent bodies. "^^

the signature drive.

In Natal the NIC had for the most part ignored

Congress branches were criticized by the NIC general-

secretary for assuming that the Durban Consultative Committee would
conduct
the campaign by itself

It must be stressed that it is not the function of
the Consultative Committee to organize the campaign
to popularize the Freedom Charter.
It is merely to
function to coordinate the work that is being done
by the different national organizations
The
Consultative Committee has not the organizational
apparatus at its disposal to wage any campaign of
its own
Congress cannot divest itself of the
responsibility for organising the Freedom Charter
campaign by loading such work into the Consultative
Committee and then forgetting all about the matter."
.

.

.

.

.

.
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At the end of the campaign., the NCC reported that it had been "rather
a very ambitious scheme, taking into consideration the state of our

organizational machinery."

Commentary

Support for Naicker's confrontation policy in 1945 had been great
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enough that his opponents within the NIC
failed to contest the election
of
his faction to leadership. Ten years later
the NIC was characterized by

branches that were either dissolving completely
or ceasing to participate
in provincial meetings.

Tliroughout the campaigns of the 1950

's

not more

than five branches could be expected to respond
to the directives of NIC
leaders.

IVliat

had happened?

The most obvious answer must also be considered the
most important.

Beginning with the resistance of 1946, the NIC had failed
to demonstrate an
ability to effectively challenge the South African government.
was not popular with Indians.

Segregation

The NIC had been consistent in voicing its

complete opposition to segregation, but by the mid-1950

's

its policy had

produced no indication of compromise from the Nationalist government.
According to Indian Opinion, the ineffectiveness of the NIC on this issue
caused India:is to ask "Miy sliould we join Congress?
us when our life possessions are in jeopardy?"

What have they to offer

The government's promise of

improved housing and social services at new Indian housing sites was an
attractive alternative to a defense of overcrowded slum areas.

A second cause must also be considered.

NIC leaders never claimed an

ability to defeat the Group Areas plan without acting in concert with the

ANC against the entire apartheid system.

The idea of such an alliance

deviated from Indian political tradition since the time of

Gandlii.

Relations

between the African and Indian communities in Natal must be considered in
any analysis of the NIC's failure.

with Africans, their approval of
been doubtful.

tlie

If Indians were reluctant to work closely

Defiance and COP campaigns must have

Victory for the Congress Alliance in all probability meant
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replacing White domination with African superiority.
accept this will be considered next.

Indian reluctance to

100

FOOTNOTES

•'•The

Guardian

^Ibid.
^Ibid.
4
^

Star
Tlie

,

,

August

January 10, 1946, p.
1,

Guardian
,

1946, p.

June 20, 1946, p.

September

,

^Ibid.

,

,

3,

5.

3.

1.

1946.

May 9, 1946, p.

August 22, 1946, p.

1.

5.

^Ibid.
September 12, 1946, p. 3. Of 754 resisters arrested
by
September, 400 were classified as workers, 31 as farmers,
8 as teadiers
7 as students, 3 as priests, 27 as businessmen, 4 as doctors, 8
as tailirs '
24 as housewives, 4 as dressmalcers
22 as clerks, 11 as shopkeepers, 3 as
photographers and one was a city councillor from Cape Town.
,

,

^

Ibid

.

,

Deceiaber 12, 1946, p.

5.

g

For a review of the United Nations session, see Pachai, Tlie
International Aspects of the South African Indian Question pp7T00-206.
,

'"^The statistics have been compiled from various issues of Indian
Opinion
and Tlie Guardian 1946-1948, reporting the total resisters arrested from
month to month.
,

•^•^

-'^

Indiaji

Opinion

,

February 28, 1947, p. 69.

The Guardian, April 17, 1947, p.

3.

13

The number of arrests was obtained from several issues of The
Guardian January -April, 1948.
,

^^

Ibid

.

,

June 10, 1948, p.

1.

"'"^Natal Indian Congress, Agenda Book
Ninth Annual Provincial Conference,
June, 1956, General-Secretary 's Auiual Report, p. 1.
,

^^George Naicker, Self-Discipline for Volunteers of the Congress of the
People unpublisiied speech delivered at the Natal Conference of the Congress
of tlie People, September 5, 1954.
,

•^^

1

p.

5.

8

Indian Opinion

,

March 14, 1947, p. 82.

Statement by Ismail Meer printed in The Guardian , September 23, 1946,

101

19

°'

cols. 9547^9548.^"''''
20

of

Dr. A. J.

^Hi^-

^'^7

1951,

Van Ryn, Hansard, May 21,
1951, col. 1457.

R.

m

Planning Council is included
Treason Trail p. 14,993.

f^^^^i*?^
Cachalia,

T
I.

'"*^"°'^>

A.

the testijnony
tebtunony

,

22

Statement by Yusef Dadoo in The Guardian

,

April 17, 1952
'

23
ilie

24

Guardian

,

November 15, 1951, p.

Leo Kuper, Durban

:

A Stud^

iji

p.

i

•

>

2.

Racial

iso.

p.

^S^^>

Sixth Annual Provincial Conference,
Febr!a^?'''|q5'J'^'?^n?''ff
February,
1953, General Secretary's Annual Report,
pp. 14-15.
26^

Leo Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa

,

123.

p.

^^^^y Msimang, provincial secretary
/?^A?^^''^^'^^'''^P^^^'^
nf
of t^^lf
the Natal AC, when he tenned the proposed starting
date "suicidal and
sheer lujiacy" because neither the ANC nor NIC was
properly organized
The
Guardian January 17, 1952, p. 8. Msimang had been an
opponent of the
African- Indian alliance.
28

Advance, December 4, 1952, p.

8.

29

Rgpo^t of the National Action Committee to the Secretary-Gen eral
of
African National Congress~and the Joint Honorary Secretaries of the~S"outh
African Indian C ongress. December 5, 1953. Typed document, unpubTisHed":
tide

30

Natal Indian Congress, Agenda Book Sixth Annual Provincial Conference,
Februaiy, 1953, General -Secretary 's Annual Report, pp. 14-15.
,

31
32

p.

Norman Levy, "8,000 to Jail", Fighting Talk (June, 1961), p. 15.
South African Indian Congress, Agenda

,

21st Conference, July, 1954,

10.

33

Report of the National Action Committee

.

•^^The complete Freedom Charter is reprinted in Africa South,
June, 1957), p. 13-16.

35

(April-

National Action Council of the Congress of the People, Report to the
Joint Executives of the ANC, SAIC, SACPO, and the SACOD p. 1.
,

^^Ibid.

,

p.

6.

102

l£g£ther
1954.

Conj^^s^ of tj^ People

:

Bul^

No. 2. August,

38

°'

1954, p.™340?-

MiHOEinion.

July 23,

39
'^'^

Adv^rAuguL'^?^
4

Wcker,

Step Forward",

?f

pelf-Disc ipline for Volunteers of the
Congress of the People.

^^Letter from Y. A. Cachalia for the
Secretariat of the NAC to -All
Provincial ana Regional Committees", December
20, 1954.
42

Dr. Jjaicker's Message to the Meeting
of the Working Committee of the
Congres_s , mipublTsHid

Na^^lndian

^i^diTi^eTlH^siHtliH^o^Hil

43
^'

^^^^

Secretary of the NAC, January 19,
mc Secretariat ^o "All i^ci,±uub
Regions

^c,,. a]id_
.nf Letter from I'
1955
P. Beyleveld, for the
and Provinces", Jajiuary 19, 1955.

IT^'.1955.
JrT
Janaury j1,

^^^i^^al Action Council to "All Regions and Provinces",

^Letter fro. National Action Council to "All Regional and
Provincial
Executives of the ANC, SAIC, COD and SACPO," March
3, 1955.
46

47

New Age

The Call
Ibid

March 17, 1955, p.

,

,

2.

special issue. May, 1955.

.

^%ational Action Council of the COP. Report of the National Action
Council of the Congress of the People to th£ Joint Executives of the ANC
'
SAIC SACPO and the SACOD
No date but prepared after the COK
,

,

.

50

Natal Indian Congress, Agenda Book Seventh Annual Provincial Conference,
February, 1954, General-Secretary 's Annual Report, pp. 32-33.
,

^^Ibid.
52

Advance

53
^ Ibid

.

,

,

March

5,

1953, p.

1.

December 10, 1953, p.

^"^NIC News,

May 20, 1954.

4.

103

Jre^V^^Z^'Z%^^ M

incos. and

ExE^ditHes

Re

Ih^.' Agenda Book, Ninth Annual Provincial Conference
^t^rence, beneralGeneral
Secretary's Organizational Report,
pp. 1-2.
,

57,

Letter from National Consultative
Committee of the ANC
qAmn to "All Regions and Provinces",
SACOD
January
19,

New Age, August 11, 1955, p.
59.,

SAIC
'

1955.

SACPO '

2.

.

National Consultative Committee, Plan of
Campaign for the Collection
of Signatures _f or the Freedom Charter
T^iHtedTii-^eS^e-BS
SoS^
African Indian Congress, Agenda 22nd Conference,
October, 1956
See also
Walter Sisulu, "Fo™rd witF-tlTe Freedom
Charter", in rxgiiLing
Fighting ^aiK,
Talk
September 11, 1955, pp. 7-8.
,

60

quoted

For SAIC opinion, see New Age, September
15, 1955, p.
New Age September 22, "1955, p. 1.

m

1.

Naicker is
i^dicxer

,

.^^National Consultative Committee, Report to the Joint
Executives of the
African National Congress, S. A. Indian Congrei?,—
AT C^ngress of Dei^cTits
and the S. A. Congress of Trade Unions
Reprinted as AnH^5HI?^6~o'^5ntE
African Indian Congress, Agenda, 22nd Conference, October
1956
.

62

Natal Indian Congress Agenda Book Ninth Annual
Provincial Conference *
General-Secretary's Organizational Report, p. 2.
,

,

63

Indian Opinion, May 11, 1956, p. 183.

104

aiAPTER V
niii

M'RO- INDIAN AJ.LIANC1-

A consideration of relations between the Indian
and African
communities is essential to an evaluation of the
NIC's contribution to the

Congress Alliance.

Apartheid is based on presumed racial differences.

It

stresses that within a multi-racial society, racial
peace is best preserved

by maintaining as little contact as possible between
the different racial
communities.

To a great extent, apartheid is based on the reality
of

political experience in South Africa.

IVliite

Before the franchise was legally

limited to Whites, for instance, education and property
requirements were

manipulated to restrict the number of Africaji and Indian voters.

Similarly,

the Bantu Education Act of 1953 did not establish a segregated
educational

system, but instead altered the curricula and control of already segregated
schools.

In short, apartheid can be interpreted as the natural result of

a persistent White effort to monopolize political power.

In their early

political activity, Indians fought to share this monopoly, but did not

protest anti -African regulation preceding the elaborate apartheid legislation of the Nationalist party government in the 1950

's.

The Congress Alliance represented a repudiation of South African

political history.

Alliance leaders attempted to build a multi-racial

organization in which each racial group received equal representation.
Various Congress officials often spoke of forming a non-racial organization
recruiting members without regard to race, but this did not materialize.
The alternate structure of an alliance based on racially exclusive

organizations was itself an aclcnowledgement that racial ties were
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fundainental to political organization.

A non-racial organization

inevitably would have been dominated by the
numerically superior Africans.
Tliis

was regarded by Congress leaders, African and
Indian alike, as too

great a departure from South African tradition to
be politically acceptable
in the 1950 's.

The multi-racial format was advantageous for
the COD and

SAIC, for it gave Whites and Indians a representation
on national committees

that did not reflect the inferiority of their membership
to that of the
ANC.

It was thus possible for Indians and Whites to
overrule their African

allies in the Congress Alliance.

Dissatisfaction with this system was at

least partially responsible for the fomation of the Pan-African
Congress
in 1959, an organization advocating a

before that

tem

became fashionable in

fom
tlie

of "black power" several years

United States.

Considering their desire to eliminate White exclusiveness in South

African politics, Indian militants such as Dadoo and Naicker understandably
were adamant in their support of a multi-racial alliance.

by the late 1940

's

It was obvious

that Whites were not going to extend the privilege of

political participation to the Indian community.

Without joining the ANC,

the Indian Congresses had no viable alternative to accommodation with the

Whites, for their numbers were simply too few.

A multi-racial rather than

a non-racial alliance was also to their benefit, for it enhanced their

prospects of national political leadership by guaranteeing equality with
the larger ANC.

Potential advnatages in the Congress Alliance also existed for
Africans.

As the racial majority, Africans might in theory have been

able to overturn apartheid without Indian or White allies, but ANC leaders
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believed multi- racialism a more
responsbile policy.

Moderates such as

Albert Luthuli were anxious to prove
that the defeat of apartheid
would
not destroy the positions of Indians
and Whites in South Africa.
The
Congress Alliance was designed in part
to demonstrate this.

It was also

hoped that political unity with Indians
and Whites would bring to the
ANC organizational experience, funds and
international exposure unavailable
to a purely African movement.

At the national level, the alliance was
established relatively
easily when Dadoo, Naicker and Xuma signed
the "pact of the doctors" in
1947, pledging mutual cooperation between the TIC,
NIC and ANC.

alliance remained intact until the banning of
the ANC in 1961.

The

National

and provincial conferences of the member organizations
were addressed

regularly by representatives of the opposite race.

Resolutions promising

continued racial cooperation were common, and after 1951
a multi-racial
national executive coordinated major Congress campaigns.

Congress Alliance

officials frequently proclaimed that they had ended racial problems
witliin

their organization.

To effectively pursue its goals, however, the Congress Alliance

required more than racial amity among a score of national leaders.

The

national executives were faced with the task of reproducing their national
cooperation at the provincial and local level and here the Natal
experience indicates they were less than successful.

White the Anti-

Segregationists preached political cooperation with Africans in the 1940 's,
the Indian and African communities of Durban found themselves in an

increasingly competitive struggle over housing and trade privileges.
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Mute

officials recognized the value of
maintaining a rivalry which

Congress leaders claimed existed only
because it grew from a social
system
dominated by the White values of racial
separateness
Whether or not the
.

root cause of Indo-African hostility
was inherent racism or the prevailing

economic and social structure, rivalry
existed that endangered the

NIC-ANC alliance.

The Conditions of Rivalry

There had been opposition to the "doctors'
pact" as early as 1948
from at least one ANC brach in Natal that asked
the Minister of the

Interior to segregate Indians from Africans because
"there could never be

mutual understanding between the two races."
president of the ANC Youth

Leac,xie,

Dr. Xuma and Oliver Tambo,

publicly refuted the branch, but Tambo

admitted that relations between the two groups appeared to "verge
on the
critical" because Africans felt they were being "preyed upon" by Indian
.

''^

merchants and landlords
Despite Tambo

's

warning, Congress leaders of both races professed

surprise when less than a year later in January, 1949, several days of

rioting in Durban by Africans against Indians left 123 dead and 20,000

homeless

.

The_

Guardian reflected the general public shock among both

African and Indian leaders when it commented that "Up until Thursday
evening there was nothing to indicate that there was any deep feeling of
resentment for the Indians."
Congress officials

,

2

If this was indeed the private attitude of

they were guilty of considerable self-delusion for

the conditions breeding racial animosity in Durban had been developing
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for some time.

During World War II thousands of Africans
migrated to Durban for
employment in the expanding war economy.
Suitable housing was non-existent
and most Africans found accommodations rented
to them by Indian landlords
in the Indian Cato Manor district.

A contemporaiy housing survey sponsored

by the University of Natal described living
conditions for most Africans:
"Among the Indians, as in every community,
there
are slum landlords, and today in this area
on
rented sites between 45,000 and 50,000 urban Natives live in congested shacks and lean-to's
Some are decrepit structures of tin, mud
walls and sacking which give little shelter from
rain, wind and cold. The shacks are grouped in
huddled clusters, often clinging precariously to
the steep lides of hills in crazy and chaotic
.

.

.

patterns ."^

Following the riots, Africans attempted to relieve their congestion
by occupying housing vacated by Indian refugees, beginning a continuing
conflict over the allocation of non-lVhite land in Durban.

The NIC was in

a difficult position, for the issue was naturally divisive to Afro-Indian
unity.

Initial NIC opposition to a proposal that the Durban City Council

purchase Indian land in Cato Manor for the construction of African housing
was criticized by Africans.

The newspaper Ilanga Lase Natal argued that

the African need for increased living space was immediate and required

satisfaction even if Indians were the victims:

"The Africans do not want to see Indians deprived
of their land
They are interested in the facts
of the situation. And the facts are that some land
belonging to somebody must be taken and used. Others
have land and to spare; the African has nothing at
all.
That is the bitter truth whether we like it or
.

.

.
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not.

Meanwhile the position is deteriorating
further and the volcano might explode at
any
moment"^

.

The belief that Indians had more land
among Africans.

tlian

they needed was widespread

The prospects for future racial haimony were
considered

dim if a "compromise was not reached that took
at least some Indian land
for African use."^

Under such pressure, the NIC altered its opposition
to

the confiscation of Indian land and supported development
of several

hundred acres in Cato Manor for African housing.

It continued to maintain

that this was a less than ideal solution and recommended
instead the

building of African communities on agricultural land to the north
and south
of Durban.

Predictably, the changed NIC policy was welcomed by Africans as an
exainple of "exemplary statesmanship", but attacked within the Indian

community as "a stab in the back of the Indian people".^

The disagreement

persisted throughout the Defiance campaign and was resolved only when the
Durban City Council recommended in 1953 that both Africans and Indians be

removed from Cato Manor and the area declared White under the

Groi^)

Areas

Act.
In addition to the housing problem, friction was also evident from

African resentment of the Indian monopoly on commercial life.
1949 riots

,

After the

Africans declared a boycott of Indian shops and bus lines and

asked the ANC and Durban city officials to pressure Indians into selling
7

their businesses to Africans as proof of their goodwill.

In the first

months of 1949, more than 200 unlicensed traders replaced Indian expellees
in Cato Manor.

Some subsequently received legitimate trading licenses,
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but five years later at least seventy
illegitimate traders remained.^
Indian businessmen generally resisted
the African competition and
claimed that their monopolies were not a
factor in causing the riots.

Tlie

statement of the Indian Bus Owners Association
following new riots in 1953
was typical:

"The Bus Owners Association maintains that
the
feelings between the bus owners and the thousands of Africans living in Cato Manor has always been cordial and still continues to be.
The riot is not the work of Africans legitimately living in Cato Manor, but is the work of
irresponsible Africans who do not belong in
the area."
9

Indian businessmen were often willing to associate with
their African

counterparts, but were less willing to accommodate the "irresponsible"
African.

Hilda Kuper detemined after a survey in the mid-1950 's that

contact between the African and Indian middle class was increasing slowly,

but noted also that the "merchant elite" was indifferent to any Africans

not considered "educated" and Westernized.""''^

Most Cato Manor Africans

were of course not part of the Westernized middle class.

Jordan Ngubane

claimed that discrimination by Indian businessmen against all classes of

Africans was common in movie theaters, hotels, restaurants and employment
hiring."*""^

Moses Kotane, an African communist and Congress official,

blamed the riots in part on the "contemptuous" attitude of many Indians
12

for Africans

Most Indian businessmen supported the NIO.

The political consequences

of their anti -Africanism, however, were shared by all Indians, including
the NIC.

According to Ngubane, Africans regarded the NIO as more

Ill

representative of Indian opinion than the NIC
sinply because they had

more contact with the merchants of the NIO:

"The riots were, in actual

fact, a demonstration against the merchant
class, but then the African

regards^the merchant class as the leadership
of the Indian community as

well."

More dramatic is the view of the African
writer Bloke Modisane

describing the consequences for the Congress Alliance
of the Durban

African's "simmering hatred" for the Indians:

"It was an intellectual concept not easily
equated with the fact that the discrimination suffered at the hands of the Indians
was far more intimate than that from the
Wliites, with whom contact was confined to
eight working hours, that the rest of the
time was spent in the neighborhood of Indians who resented violently any form of social mobility with Africans".
14

The accusations of Modisane and Ngubane were acknowledged by some
Indians.

Manilal Gandhi wrote in Indian Opinion that Ngubane 's charges

were "unfortunately irrefutable" and that many Indian merchants regarded
Africans only as subjects for

economic exploitation."''^

Naicker urged

Indians to abandon notions of racial superiority, which he claimed were
too often evident in their "day to day activities" with Africans.

'^^

Despite these communal differences, the Indian and African Congress
leaders preserved their unity in the aftermath of the Durban riots.

Indians and Africans were asked to surmount the daily problems dividing

them and recognize that the riots were caused by the "political, economic
and social structure" of apartheid imposed by White authority.

To

eliminate the causes by defeating apartheid, membership in the ANC and
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NIC were encouraged.

Naicker and A. W.

G. Champion,

president of the

Natal ANC in 1949, promised to establish local
committees to promote
"mutual understanding and goodwill" between the two
races.

An Indian

Congress official interviewed after the riots emphasized
not the immediate
causes of dissension, but the common struggle of African
and Indian against
the color bar.

the Africans."

The Indian people, he said, had "no ill-feeling against
18

More than twenty years after the riots, an Indian scholar

observed that the riots had created "an era of understanding between
Indians
and Africans that was sorely wanting before.""^^

Tlie

Failure of Conciliation

Congress leaders certainly recognized after the riots that their hopes
for an effective multi-racial alliance based on mass organizations of Africans

and Indians were in jeopardy.
comriiunal

The extent of their success in solving inter-

differences is more doubtful.

In the months immediately after the

1949 riot, little local work was done by a joint council established by the

Congresses to improve race relations.

20

It was perhaps too soon to expect

people who had only recently been killing one another to respond to appeals
to join the respective political organizations that advocated unity between

them.

The immediate demands of the Africans boycotting Indian shops and

buses can reasonably be presumed to have had more appeal than the plaintive

pleas for cooperation and understanding.

Tlie

Congresses in fact had no

immediate alternative to offer to Africans occupying their homes in
Indian areas, or to Indians who wanted their old homes and businesses
returned.

Since the Congresses were unable to solve the problems separating
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their potential supporters

,

it is not surprising that their
coinmittees

to improve race relations were inoperative.

The interventions of Wliite authorities
sustained African -Indian
tension.

The Durban City Council's reaction to a
national day of protest

against the Suppression of Communism Act sponsored
by the Congress Alliance
in 1950 is indicative.

Congress claimed that in Durban sixty percent
of

the city's 200,000 non -White workers stayed
at home on the June 26 protest

Most were Indians.

day.

The response of the City Council was calculated

to prevent any further inter-racial cooperation
among the city's workers.

The Council dismissed 300 Indians and eighty Africans
who had not worked on
the protest day.

Hie Council also announced a future policy of replacing

all Indians leaving the municipal service with Africans, in
"appreciation of
the responsible and loyal conduct of its Bantu employees, who perfomed

their
.

.

.

nomal duties

on June 26, 1950, thereby distinguishing themselves

from the Indian political agitators

."^"^
.

.

In addition to their

jobs, the dismissed workers lost unemployment benefits and municipal housing.

The firings increased the penalties for participation in political protest

beyond the occasional fines levied against the Congress leadership.

African

and Indian unemployment was high and the prospects for new jobs in 1950 were
few.

By not joining with Indians, Africans were being rewarded with work

as well as housing gained during the riots.

The continuing African -Indian rivalry of the early 1950

's

in Durban

offers an additional reason for the failure of the Defiance campaign there.

Indian suspicion of Africans was suggested by one Congress official as a

direct cause of the limited Indian participation.

22

A member of the NIC
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executive reported that Indians questioned
the ability of Africans to
resist White-inspired provocation against
Indians.

limited to the NIC.

The mistrust was not

Ngubane suggested that ANC leaders
did not make a

vigorous appeal for African participation
because the canpaign required
close cooperation with the Indian Congress.^"*

An appeal by Luthuli to the Natal ANC suggests
the White policy of
dividing the potential allies had had some success:

"I have deliberately referred to the need
for a
multi-racial democratic front because there is
much confusion on the subject in Natal, especially
as regards the Indians.
Some in Natal are being
misled by the Indian bogey
All people in
their struggle seek allies. Africans must get it
into their heads that the stumbling block to their
progress are (sic) the many discriminatory laws
made by a White Parliament and not by Indians.
What privileges Indians enjoy whicli we don't enjoy
were given them by a White Parliament. Why blame
the recipient and not blame the giver for not giving Africans those rights and privileges? It is
only white propaganda that makes the Indian appear
a mortal danger to South Africa.
Let us cooperate
without fear with all people who share our objectives."
.

.

.

25

A similar appeal to Indians was made by George Naicker:
"Members of Congress must at all times in all their
actions demostrate in no uncertain terms that they
completely reject the idea of 'superior and inferior
races
All day to day activities must be such that
no one can accuse them of being guilty, no matter in
how small a measure, of accepting the 'herrenvolk'
ideology of the ruling class."
.

'

26

Both the Luthuli and Naicker addresses were delivered after the
Defiance canpaign and suggest a lack of candor in the more common Congress
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claim that the campaign greatly improved
Afro- Indian political cooperation
in Natal. A conclusion more consistent
with the results of the campaign
is that continued disputes over
housing and trade privileges
virtually

precluded effective collaboration.

National and provincial Congress
leaders

were willing to cooperate, but their followers
were less than enthusiastic.
TTiese

continuing difficulties combined with
organizational decay in

the NIC in 1953 explain the inability of the
NIC to establish the racially

mixed political units called for durin the campaign.

Tlie

campaign itself

does not appear to have substantially raised the
level of political

cooperation.

Both supporters and critics of the Congress movement
continued

to note the need for improved relations between
Indians and Africans

Ngubane criticized "unwise wishful thinking" which maintained
that race
relations were good:

"There is no valid reason to substantiate the

generally held view that all is well between the African and the Indian."^''
Indian Opinion reported that a majority did not yet exist within the NIC
in
1956 for cooperation with Africans as political equals.

Before unity of

purpose was acheived, a "recasting of attitudes" would have to occur.
The findings of an infomial survey conducted by Fatima Meer at late
as in 1960 reveal few Indian attitudes were "recast".

She reported the

continuing cooperation between Congress leaders, emphasizing that all
important political decisions were reached only after consultation between
officials of the two organizations.

On the other hand, she also reported

a continuing bias against Africans on the part of most Indians.

informal contact between African and Indian occured.

Little

This was blamed not

on racial prejudice, but on the "arrogance" of Indians who did not believe
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in "the inherent equality of the two
peoples. "^^

Wiether "arrogance" or

"racism", the effect on close political
cooperation between African and
Indian was likely to be the same.
The potential for disagreement was
great enough for Ngubane to suggest,

after the Defiance campaign, that the two
Congresses in future not attempt
close collaboration at the local level.

Instead, he urged that each

concentrate on building support within its own
community without emphasizing
the multi-racial alliance.

Ngubane's proposal was frequently attacked

by Congress supporters as an acceptance of
apartheid principles, but there

was some merit in his opinion, for if nothing else,
it would have prevented
the leaders of the Congress Alliance from establishing
unattainable goals.

Ngubane asked Congress to accept Modisane's claim that, for
most Africans,
the Congress Alliance was an "intellectual concept" offering
no solution to

the labor and housing problems of the African community.

Commentary

The belief that the Durban riots began an era of understanding between

African and Indian is not supported by the political events of following
years.

African and Indian leaders failed in their attempt to make the

Congress Alliance work on

a grand scale.

The speedies of Congress

officials to their organizations indicate that the members of each group

remained mutually suspicious.

Given this situation, it is misleading to

speak of an effective Congress Alliance in Natal.

In neither the Defiance

Campaign nor the COP campaign did the two Congresses work effectively
together.
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Racial antagonism may not have been the
only cause of this disunity,
but its impact must be considered
significant.

Antipathies existing since

the Gandhi era proved impossible to
eradicate in only a few years of the

Dadoo-Naicker-Xuma pact.

The "arrogance" of Indians toward
Africans

discovered by Fatima Meer proved that the disparaging
descriptions employed
by Gandhi to describe Africans in 1900 still
existed in 1960.

The common

disabilities shared under apartheid were not, despite
the urgings of ANC

and NIC leaders, sufficient to overcome this.
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CHAPTER VI
THE FAILURE TO ORGANIZE

Organization is a goal of virtually all political
groups.

Leaders

by definition must have someone to lead and the
exercise of leadership
is made

easier when supporters are organized.

Tlie

necessary functions of

communicating decisions, deteimining the morale of members,
recruiting new

members and raising money are all facilitated when leaders can
work through

organized political channels.

If leaders must depend on the press, mass

rallies and pamphleteering to communicate with their followers,
control,

particularly during an active political campaign, becomes difficult.

Without organization, leaders have little precise knowledge of how many
will follow their instructions and therefore find it difficult to estimate

beforehand the potential success of any venture.
Organization is made both more necessary and more difficult when the
leaders seek to form a "mass" political body.

To enroll and lead thousands

of members ideally requires a cadre of permanent organizers, popular issues
and some reasonable prospect of success.

In a mass organization, the

executive level of leadership cannot maintain personal supervision of the
entire membership; a second and possibly a third echelon must be delegates
this function.

If the leaders cannot rely on these subordinates, they are

likely to find themselves with little to command.

Organizations resemble military units in their striving for command
and control.

This was a particular characteristic of "left" political

parties which at times was copied by their political enemies of the
"right",

Michels and Duverger have explored at some length the strengths
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aiid

weaJoiesses of such political parties in
Europe, while Hodgkin has

examined the numerous attenpts to build similar
parties in Africa/
Until the mid-1960

's,

Africans were thought to have been
unusually

proficient at building parties patterned after
the socialist and communist
parties of Europe, although that opinion is
less fashionable today.

^

Tlie

relative ease with which several governments based
on "mass" party support,

particularly those in Ghana and Algeria, were toppled by
military coup
d^etats contributed to the revised opinions.

In South Africa, leaders of

the African National Congress worked in the 1950

's

to build such an

organization, but were only partially successful.^

Confrontationist leaders of the Natal Indian Congress also attempted

without success to construct a mass political organization.

Their failure

in three attempts to mobilize the Indian people has already been
studied
Tliis

chapter reviews in detail the failure to transfoiro the NIC from an

elite organization dependent on street comer rallies for contact with its

"membership" into a disciplined structure responsive to the commands of
its officials.

The Formal Constitutional Structure

Unlike the TIC, the NIC possessed much of the constitutional regalia
of a mass political party.

Constitutions are frequently not very useful

guides to the functioning of organizations, but they do permit comparison

of reality with an ideal.

In the case of the NIC, the constitution's

omissions are as interesting as its description of how the Congress was

supposed to work.

The constitution considered here was adopted in 1951
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and used with only minor revisions throughout the decade/

NIC members were organized into branches with a minimum
enrollment
of twenty-five each.

Branch members elected a Branch Committee whicli
was

required to meet "not less than once every two months."

This committee

appointed an Executive Committee of five members to supervise
branch
activities between meetings of the Branch Committee.

Meetings of the

entire branch membership were required at least once a year.

Participants

at this annual meeting elected the branch chairman, two joint
secretaries,
a treasurer and the delegates to the NIC's annual provincial conference.

Branches were required to keep "detailed" membership lists
books.

ajid

account

Their annual contribution to the provincial NIC was fixed at 1/1

for each of the first 500 members and 5/- for each additional 100 members.

According to the constitution, NIC policy was determined by the
brancli delegates to the annual provincial conference.

described as the "supreme authority".

The conference was

Each branch was allowed a minimum

of three delegates for its first twenty-five members, with one additional
delegate for each additional 100 members.
for a provincial conference was small:

Tne number of delegates required

twenty percent of

tlie

maximum

possible, representing at least one- third of the branches.

Delegates to the provincial conference elected a Working Committee
to "exercise the po^y/er and function of Congress and assume the direction

of its affairs" between annual meetings, as long as it did not change

policy detemined at the provincial conference.

The Working Committee

included the Congress president, secretaries, treasurers and branch
representatives.

Each branch had two representatives on the Working
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Committee for its first 300 members and one delegate for
300 members

.

eacli

additional

The Working Committee was required to meet at least
once

every three months.

In the intervals between meetings, its authority
was

delegated to an Executive Committee, consisting of the President,
GeneralSecretary, Honorary Treasurer, several vice-presidents and eleven
others

elected by the provincial conference.

This committee possessed the

"administrative and executive" powers of Congress.

The Executive Committee

in turn selected a seven member Secretariat from among its members
to deal

with subjects assigned by the Executive.
Tlie

1951 constitution said little about ideology, discipline, or the

obligations of members.

The official "Objects" of the NIC contained

nothing to suggest the "left" orientation of its leadership.

pledged to "work for

aiid

to foster cooperation

...

The NIC was

on matters of common

interest" with non- Indian political organizations, but the constitution

made no specific reference to formal pacts with non-Indian groups.
The only requirements for membership in the NIC were residence in
Natal, payment of an initial fee of 1/- (about fourteen cents) and

of eighteen years.

payment.

aii

age

Members had no monetary obligation after the initial

The constitution is silent on any requirement to attend regular

branch meeting or perform any other duties to maintain their status

.

The

possibility of a tenuous connection between branch members and their
officials was apparently recognized.

Members were to be contacted "by

ordinary post or by advertisement in a newspaper circulating in the area
or by the distribution of hand bills.

.

."

It does not mention disseminating

the news at any regular branch meetings because the constitution did not
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provide for them.
The contrast between the vague references to
the role of

tl;e

membership

and the detailed outline of committees at regular
provincial and branch
levels is interesting.

Members orgajiized at the branch level were to
be

the basis of Congress political strength.

Brajiches were expected to

provide the nucleus of support for any Congress activity,
working witliin
their districts to gain additional support for such projects
as the Congress
of the People.

Despite this, the attitude towards members of the NIC

constitution was reminiscent of the accommodationist disregard for
building
a mass political organization.

For the leadership, the link with the brandies was the Working
Committee.

Witliout regular, well-attended meetings of this committee,

Congress officials could expect little infoniiation about branch affairs

and would find it difficult to communicate their proposals to branch
officers.

However

If the branches did not function. Congress would be powerless.

diligently the provincial Executive Committee and Secretariat

planned political activities, without the branches they were for the most
part planning for themselves.
It has already been noted tliat when Naicker and the Ant i -Segregationists

gained control of the NIC in 1945 organization was minimal.

The new

leadership, liowcver, claimed it had brought into the NIC at least 17,000

new members, giving a total mcmbersliip of approximately 35,000.

Tlie

task

of the now leadership was to organize this support into a political

organization responsive to its demands.

Tlie

Naicker group failed.

following ten years, they requested much but received little.

In the
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The Failure of Organization

The Congress organization is best examined by
studying participation
at its anjiual confemces, attendance at committee
meetings and

communications between provincial headquarters and
the brandies.

Branch

records are more difficult to obtain than provincial
records, but when

available the minutes of branch meetings provide insiglit
into the

functioning of the NIC on a local level not found elsewhere.

Although the provincial conference was officially the "supreme
authority" of the NIC, from the first annual meeting in 1947 through
the
twelfth in 1959, no more than sixty percent of the eligible delegates

A majority of

attended.

bra:iches considered active sent delegations, but

few were fully represented.

Since conference records did not contain the

number of delegates allotted to each branch, a more precise determination
of the representation of various branches is impossible.
1,

the number of delegates was relatively constant.

As seen in Figure

The impact of

particular campaigns appears insignificant in determining attendance at the
annual conference.

Figure

Attendance at Five NIC Annual Conferences

1.

Conference
1947
1951
1953
1955
1959

Delegates
Attending/Eligible
101 /
NA
96
88
110
80

Tlie

/

173
169
219

/

NA

/

/

Branches
Represented/ Active

NA

28

/

15
16

/

20

/

NA

14
12

/

17

/

NA

number of branches considered active by the NIC's general-

secretary fell by more than half, from twenty-eight in 1947 to twelve in
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1959.

The Defia^ice and COP campaigns failed to
increase participation

by braiich delegates, as Congress Alliaiice officials
had hoped

tliey

would.

The low participation at provincial conferences
continued during the

year at the Working Committee meetings.
the 1950 's.

Attendance

Iiere

fluctuated during

Preparation for the Defiajice campaign was reported to have

increased participation "greatly" between 1951 and 1952, although
some
branches were not represented at all during the campaign.^

During the

following year, however, representation again became "disappointing"
and
one scheduled meeting was adjourned for lack of a quorum.^

After a year's

work on the COP campaign, the NIC general-secretary reported the Committee
was functioning well, but the improvement was not sustained.

general -secretary again had to report that attendance at
"much to be desired".

tlie

By 1956, the

committee left

He was especially critical of the lack of concern

members showed for the decline in Congress activity after the COP.^
The work of

tlie

ten -member Executive Committee provided little

inspiration to the Working Committee.

During the Defiance campaign its

affairs were conducted by "a few willing members"; "lethargy" and

"inactivity" were adjectives used to characterize the attitude of most
members.

^'^

By the middle of the COP work, a majority of members were

attending, but some continued to be regularly absent.

Government political

bannings in 1954 produced several vacancies on the committee.
replacements were not an improvement,

llie

The

general -secretary felt they
"^"^

were not serious about performing the duties of their off ice.

The Failure to Communicate

Considering the disorganization and disinterest evident at the
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provincial level, it is not surprising that NIC
officials found it difficult
to maintain contact with individual branches,
or that branches responded

with indifferenc to many headquarters directives.
by considering the effort of

tlie

The problem is illustrated

NIC to begin a series of political lectures

in each branch.

Insufficient political education had been cited by the
National Action
Committee coordinating the Defiance campaign as a major reason
for the
,

r

campaign's failure.

12

To correct this, the NIC began in 1953 to urge

branches to hold political classes using lectures provided by the provincial
headquarters.

The effort continued until after the COP campaign in 1955.

The lectures explained South African history, politics and economics

according to Marxist theory.

Several lectures were planned, including ones

on "Capitalism", "Wages Under Capitalism", "Fascist Dictatorship", and
"The Rise of the Working Class".

There is no indication that more than the

first two were ever distributed to Congress branches.
Tlie

limited success of this membership indoctrination program is

evident from

tlie

constant queries from NIC officials to the branches

attempting to increase the number offering the classes

.

The use of the

lectures was apparently left to the discretion of individual branches, for
copies of lecture notes had not been distributed to every brancli.

Branches

were asked to obtain their copies from the Congress headquarters in Durban.

Implementation of the program was described in a newsletter to branches
as a "must".

13

By October, 1953, NIC brandies at Merebank, Sydenham, CK^erport,

Pietemaritzburg and Durban Central were conducting lectures.

A new branch.
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Greyville, began classes in early 1954, while the Ladysmith
branch was

preparing to begin them "soon".
faded quickly, however.

14
Tlie

initial enthusiasm of some branches

By March, 1954, Sydenham, Overport and Merebank

had suspended their classes.

At the beginning of the COP campaign, therefore, NIC officials
had
made little progress in implementing the Congress Alliance belief
that

increased political education would strengthen their organization.

NIC

headquarters at this time was in fact receiving little information of any
sort from the branches.

The NIC newsletter criticized all the branches for

not responding to the appeals of the Orgajiizing Secretary for monthly
reports of their activities:

"not one single branch responded.

""^^

Similar difficulties were encountered in attempting to raise funds
from the branches.

Lack of funds was a common complaint voiced by the

national coordinating committees formed to oversee the various Congress

Alliance campaigns.

Whatever the willingness of the provincial NIC to

contribute, its ability would in any case have been restricted because of
the poor financial contributions received from the brandies.
In late 1953 the NIC was described as "dangerously broke", with only

the Overport, Sydenham and Merebank brandies donating money to the

The Congress newsletter asked "What are the branches doing?"

headquarters.
to raise money.

16

A special appeal in early 1954 produced few results,

even after a list of the delinquent branches and the amounts owed had been
circulated.

Tlie

monthly sums requested from each branch varied according

to the estimated membership, but were not large.

Before the COP campaign

began, most branches owed less than tlO and only two owed more than t20.
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Monthly levies were small.

Overport, for instance,

v^^as

expected to pay

LI 5/- and Tongaat, h 15/-.

Despite the claimed rejuvenation of the COP campaign,
the situation
did not improve.

Only six branches contributed money to send delegates
to

the COP and at the end of that movement the NIC was more
than L2,000 in
debt.^-^

These financial problems are partially explained by the fact that
the NIC had no systematic plan for raising funds after recruits had
paid

their initial membership fee.

Since members were not required to pay

periodic dues, both branches and the provincial lieadquarters were dependent
upon requests for donations made in conjunction with whatever political
activity was in progress.

At no time did the NIC have a regular source of

income which allowed it to estimate with reliability its financial status
six months in the future.

active in the mid-1950
to the provincial NIC.

's,

Of the approximately fifteen branches considered
no more than two or three consistently contributed

The remainder responded only occasionally to the

pleas of Congress officials
Branches that did not sponsor political lectures or contribute to
Congress finances were not necessarily inactive.

Several branches concerned

themselves with a variety of local problems not directly related to Congress

Alliance campaigns.

In early 1954, the Verulam branch had appointed no

members to the NIC Working Committee, but was reported to be organizing

hawkers and peddlers to protest against the Durban Licensing Board.

Pietermaritzburg branch was preparing presentations against
of Group Areas in that city.

tlie

The

declaration

Expenses here may explain why that branch
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owed more to the NIC than most others.

IS

Concentration on local problems had been recommended
by the National

Action Council of the COP as a means of increasing
support for the Congress
movement, while at the same time propagandizing for
the Freedom Charter.
It is doubtful that NIC branches in their local
work made such a connection.

After the COP, the NAC reported that the "four sponsoring
organizations at
no stage managed successfully to
the people.

linlc

COP with the day-to-day struggles of

19

It is apparent that the organization outlined for the NIC in
its

constitution functioned only spasmodically.

The trend was to decay rather

than growth, whatever the public reports made by Congress leaders that
"the people" were supporting the movement.

workers fluctuated from issue to issue

from this a viable organization.

aiid

Tlie

enthusiasm of Congress

the NIC was not able to construct

Instead of increasing its support, the

NIC had by 1959 admitted losing more than half the branches claimed in 1947.
This decay can be traced more specifically through the Congress branch at

Merebank

Merebank:

Tlie

areas.

From Strength to Weakness

Merebank branch was founded in 1953 in one of Durban's Indian
During that year it was one of the few brandies to conduct regular

political classes for its members and one of only three cited for its
financial contributions to the provincial NIC.

At the Seventh Annual

Provincial Conference in 1954, Merebank reported it had recruited 225 new

members during a year in which NIC leaders were critical of the low level
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of Congress activity.

Only four other branches reported adding
new

members at that conference; their total was only
205.

In April,

1954,

Merebank was congratulated for its "consistency" after
the branch had
organized a conference on housing attended by representatives
of twenty-four
.

other groups.

20

The branch chaiiman, R. G. Pillay, was a member of
the

NIC Executive Committee during the COP campaign, although
two of five meetings in 1954.

lie

attended only

In 1956, he was elected by the NIC Working

Committee to be one of thirty delegates to the SAIC conference.

contributed more money for

tlie

Merebank

transportation of delegates to the COP than

any other branch except Mayville.

In

a:i

organization characterized by

inactive branches, Merebank apparently was

m

exception.

After three years of relative diligence in fulfilling its Congress
obligations, the Merebank branch virtually collapsed after the COP.

Its

annual general meeting in July, 1955, was attended by only forty-five
21

members.
no funds.

Perhaps because of its contribution to the COP, the brancli had
22

Subsequent

minutes of branch committee meetings revealed that

at no time during the next year did the branch have more than L2 available

for expenses.

Merebank 's participation in the One Million Signature drive after the
COP was conducted irregularly by its officials

.

No signatures were

collected until December, 1955, when the Branch Committee decided that
"those members available" would canvass

tlie

branch area.

No further action

was taken until February, 1956, when three groups were formed under the

leadership of Pillay and the branch secretary and treasurer.

following two months,

tlie

In the

officials reported collecting 100 signatures.
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After March, no further reports were made on the signature
campaign.
During the year after the COP, Merebank attempted to
continue the

political classes it had begun in 1953.
were poor.

A class held on

Results, with one exception,

Marcli 10 was considered "well -attended" but

more common were reports to the Branch Committee that the classes were
a
"flop".

23

Tlie

declining interest represented by poor attendance at the branch

annual meeting and the political classes extended to members of the Branch

Committee as well.

Seventeen committee numbers had been elected in July,

reminders of possible expulsion for non-attendance were sent to absentees
at both the October and December meetings.

Tlie

notices had little effect.

In March, five members were expelled and additional warnings were sent to

five others.

In April, the Secretary, R. S. Balli, announced his intention

to resign from the committee at the next annual meetings because the branch

was disintegrating.

Before leaving office, he wrote to all committee

members after the July meeting had been postponed for lack of a quorum:

"This is a bad state of affairs and postponing meetings is a waste of time and retards the work of the Branch. We have many
important matters that require the attention
of the Committee and members failure to attend the meetings make it impossible for the
Branch to function as it should. "^^

Tne decline of the Merebank branch during the year after the COP
was not unique, for most branches were not active.

Merebank 's problems

were those of the provincial NIC on a local scale.

More than half of the

branch leadership was not sufficiently interested to regularly attend
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their committee meetings.

Membership was disappearing.

The COP signature

drive did nothing to increase membership; the signatures
collected amounted
to less than half the membership of 1953.

Tne Merebank Branch Committee minutes from which this account
was
taken did not specify the cause of the decline.

Tlie

impression that

emerges most strongly, however, is one of apathy and resignation on the

part of both members and officials.

This is not surprising.

Confrontationist

tactics had failed to defeat Group Areas or any other aspect of the

apartheid system.

Tliis

was especially obvious in Merebank.

The Durban

City Council was preceeding in 1955 with plans to acquire privately -owned
Indian land for construction of municipal housing for Indians.

opposition of R.

G.

Tlie

Pillay, as chairman of the Coordinating Committee on

Housing for Merebank, obviously did not renew interest in NIC activities
in the area.

IVhether or not Merebank Indians supported the City Council's

plan, it is obvious that they did not feel sufficiently threatened by it to
25

join the NIC in opposition.

Without such motivation, the NIC could not

expect to sustain itself.
The provincial leadership was not unaware of the disintegration of its

organization.
proposed.

Self-criticism was common and organizational changes were

The Ninth Annual Provincial Conference in 1956 featured the

most exhaustive analysis of the Congress organization ever presented to
the branch delegates.

The Ninth Conference:

"We have made no serious effort

..."

The general -secretary's organizational report to the delegates at the
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Ninth Conference contradicted completely the public recitations of Congress
accomplishments made after the campaigns of 1952 and 1954-55.

Failure at

both the branch and provincial levels was reviewed and the conference
adopted resolutions acknowledging the vailidity of the criticism.
The most serious charge was that Congress had done nothing to halt
the decline in its membership:

"Since the 1945 campaign by the present leadership against the 'old guard' of Congress we
have made no endeavor to recruit new members
or to consolidate the old. Since this campaign was carried out over ten years ago, we
have made no serious effort to recruit the
many thousands that are eligible for Congress
membership each year. Neither have we made
any endeavor to recruit those that were not
recruited during the 1945 canipaign.''^^

The primary responsibility for not recruiting was placed with the
branches.

Branches were specifically criticized for expecting the

provincial Executive Committee to plan and conduct all campaigns without
assistance from the branches.

Too often, the general -secretary reported,

Branch Committees were dominated by "windbags" and "old members who occupy
executive positions merely on the strength of their past services."
Delegates were asked to seek "reliable, responsible and energetic"
replacements willing to work actively on Congress plans.
The proposed solutions were logical, but the report did not suggest

how they might be achieved.

Branches were to renew their enire membership,

collect dues of 1/- per month from all members, and hold membership meetings
monthly.

To make meetings more interesting, the general -secretary

literature
suggested frequent political discussion, guest speakers and
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sales.

Branch executives themselves were advised to meet regularly and

to send organizational reports to the provincial Executive Committee.

The difficulty with

proposed before.

tliis

reform program was that it had all been

The experience of the Merebank branch illustrates the

probability that they would not succeed.

The Merebank Branch Committee

had already attempted to revitalize itself by threatening expulsion of
delinquent members.

Tlie

actual removal of nearly one -third of the

committee had not prevented the Secretary's resignation.

Faced with such

difficulties at the executive level, it was unrealistic to expect Merebank
to revive its membership.

Merebank had also held the political discussions

proposed by the NIC general -secretary, but they had not enticed large
turnouts of Branch members
The provincial leadership was also criticized for failing to provide

an adequate example for the branches to follow.

Tiie

atmosphere of a Congress

in crisis was absent:

"Attendance at Working Committee, Executive Committee and Secretariat often leaves much to be
desired and the tendency to transact business in
a routine day to day basis is ever present."
27

The remedies suggested for provincial inactivity were no more

innovative than those for the branches.

Provincial officials were asked

to request regular reports of branch activities, keep branches informed

of Congress policies by issuing "bulletins, leaflets, and news flashes",

and provide lecturers to explain Congress positions.

All of these

criticisms and the recommended solutions were adopted in a

resolution

noting the seriousness of the NIC's organization and the Ninth Annual
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Provincial Conference adjourned.
The conference had spawned committees to continue
investigating its

problems.

Tne first report of the organizing sub-committee
indicated that

the hopes for immediate improvements were modes t.^^

recommended publication of a monthly bulletin

The committee

for distribution to all

branches, regular meetings by the provincial executive with at least
one

"activits" from

eacli

branch in the Durban area, and the collection of

monthly levies from "all contributors".

One half of the money was to be

kept by the branches and the other sent to NIC headquarters.
of donors was not expected to be large.

Tlie

number

The committee said it would

prepare 500 cards to record the contributions of individual members.

A constitutional sub-committee proposed that new members be more
carefully scrutinized by requiring potential recruits to make a written
application.

The committee also suggested minor revisions in branch

representation on the Working Committee and the creation of a "register
of levy-paying members" to be kept by the NIC's joint honorary
30

secretaries.

These changes were not adopted and the decline in Congress continued.
As already noted, the number of active branches fell to twelve by the

twelfth annual conference.

Membership requirements had not been changed.

Life membership remained available for payment of 1/-; annual dues were

still not required.

New Age reported the most inportant topic to be

considered at the twelfth conference was the state of the NIC's
organization.

31
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Commentary

The era of mass campaigns by

tlie

Congress Alliance had ended.

The

State of Emergency declared by the South African government after the

Sharpville shootings in 1960 resulted in the banning of the African

National Congress and the arrests of major Indian Congress leaders,
including George Naicker.

Dadoo left South Africa.

If reorganization had

not been successful by then, its prospects in the future were non-existent.

Fatima Meer understated the situation

wlien she

activity in 1960 as "comparatively subdued".

described Indian political

32

Congress had been subdued

since its failure to revitalize itself during the COP campaign.

Tlie

head

of the organization remained active and therefore visible for a few more

years, but the body steadily disintegrated.
The NIC failed to become a mass political organization in part because
it had no organization, even for a minimum cadre of braiicli activists.

The

potential for organization had existed in 1945, but little had been done to
take advantage of it.

Tlie

failure of the 1946 passive resistance campaign

apparently discouraged many who were not firm in their support.

At the

conclusion of the 1946 campaign, the NIC remained what it had always been;
an elite group.

Leaders knew that thousands supported them, but

tliis

support was evident through attendance at rallies and demonstrations

announced by the press, not through brancli reports citing increased

membership registration.

Only the politics of the elite group had ciianged.

Confrontationists had displaced accommodationists without significantly
improving the NIC's organizational status.
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Without an effective organization at the beginning of their tenure,
the NIC militants had no reasonable expectation of expanding it during
the
1950 's.

At best, the NIC was static; at its worst, it lost members.

Tlie

Congress Alliance often stressed its ability to "mobilize" support among
Indians and Africans.
cajirpaigns

In the Indian community, this was rhetoric.

Alliance

did not mobilize the Indian community; Alliance canpaigns did not

even mobilize the NIC.

Tlie

1952 and 1954 campaigns were in part conducted

to expand Congress organization.

Their actual effect was a partial

reactivation of a failing NIC organization.

Within a few months, the

organization was again in decline.
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming was a communication failure

between provincial headquarters and the branches.
brandies was poor during the 1950

's.

Communication with most

The continued failure of branches

to respond to pleas for information leaves only two conclusions:

branch

officials were too embarrassed to report the state of their branches, or
they were
NIC.

simi^Dly

not interested in the campaigns planned by the provincial

Either reason was equally serious.

Without communication, it may have

been difficult for NIC officials to appreciate the extent of disorganization
in the branches, or the reasons for it.

Perhaps this explains why the

remedies suggested at the Ninth Conference were essentially a compilation
of previous solutions
If the testimony of the leadership is accepted, and there is little

reason to doubt it, the NIC was never very "organized" at all.

It is

difficult to claim organization for a group which at no time Imew who its

members were or made serious efforts to recruit new members

.

Not only was
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the NIC never a "mass" political organization of the Duverger type,
the

leaders did not seem to care very much.

In its political organization, the

NIC remained more the party of Gandhi than the party of Lenin.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

The main purpose set at the beginning of this work was
to explore the
reasons

wliy

the Natal Indian Congress failed to become a mass
organization,

capable of bringing effective Indian political support to the Congress
Alliance.

To accomplish this, emphasis has been given to a description and

analysis of the three major NIC political efforts between 1946

ajid

to relations between the Indian and African communities in Natal.

been shown that the NIC did not possess

tlie

1955 and
It has

popular appeal often credited

to it and therefore did not contribute very much to the Congress Alliance

campaigns of the 1950

's.

In this concluding chapter, two tasks remain.

Firstly, the limited

political efforts of the NIC after the end of the COP signature campaign
in 1956 will be reviewed briefly.

The NIC did not disband after 1956, but

its contribution to the Congress Alliance became even less significant

than in previous years.

Tlie

Congress Alliance itself ended with the

bajming of the ANC in 1961 and the COD in 1962.

Tlie

Indian Congress was

not banned, but nearly its entire leadership was removed from political
life in 1963 when all individuals

wlio

had previously been named as communists

under the Suppression of Communism Act were banned.'^

Many of the more

militant Alliance leaders began underground political activity and formed
a guerilla organization, Uml^onto We Sizewe

.

Only a few Indians participated
2

in this new phase of resistance to apartheid.

Secondly, the causes of the

NIC's political failure will be summarized and comment made on the Indian

political future in South Africa.
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NIC

:

Viie

Final Years

The COP campaign had not contributed significantly to a renewal of

Congress organizational strength, but it had gained considerable publicity
for the movement.

Publicity was important, for it enabled the Congress

Alliance members to maintain the illusion of strength.

Perhaps for this

reason, Congress Alliance members reacted with enthusiasm to a proposal

made at a conference of the Interdenominational African Ministers'

Federation at Bloemfontein in October, 1956.
was similar to that of the COP:

Tlie

ministers' primary goal

the convening of a conference representative

of all South African racial groups to form a multi-racial united front
3

against apartheid.

Tlie

ministers adopted a document known as the

Bloemfontein Charter which reiterated complete opposition to apartheid and

maintained that "Africans and other non-Europeans are entitled to all
rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed by Europeans wherever they live
4

and work."

The Charter included the familiar call to "mobilize all people"

against apartheid.

The South African Indian Congress welcomed the Qiarter,

citing it as evidence that "the stability of the Nationalists is built on
sand" and that "the forces supporting the government are diminishing" while
5

the opponents of apartheid grew stronger.

Despite the optimism of the SAIC, the Bloemfontein Charter did not

produce any significant change in the status of the Congress Alliance.

More

than a year after the African ministers had issued their call, a multi-racial

conference was finally held, attended by representatives of the Liberal and

Labour parties and other "liberal" White political organizations.

Conference

Naicker and
sponsors from the Congress Alliance included Luthuli, Dadoo,
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Yusef Cachalia.
llie

conference adopted a series of resolutions consistent with the

COP'S Freedom Charter.

Apartheid was

condcrraied,

aiid

the United Nations'

Declaration of Human Rights was cited as justification for establishing
equal political riglits for all South AfriccUis.

Universal adult suffrage

was recommended as an ideal, but the conference participants could not agree
on how quickly this might be adiieved.
Tlie

conference had no impact on political organization of the Congress

particpants.

Unlike the COP preparations, no mass campaign was conducted

in an effort to involve Congress members,

llie

conference was criticized in

one Congress publication for its failure to do more than issue "a further

tabulation of grievances" and for involving only "some few leaders of
Congress movement

...

tlie

a scattering of trade unionists and a little

6

professional yeast."

A committee was formed to plan regional multi-racial

conferences to coordinate anti- apartheid work, but these regional meetings
7

were never held.
Tlie

political futility of the Bloemfontein conference at the national

level was paralleled in Natal, where the NIC attempted without much success
to widen participation in the anti -apartheid movement.

Tlie

NIC sponsored a

conference on Group Areas in May, 1956, at which Alan Paton, chairman of
the Liberal Party, proposed formation of a new Provincial Vigilajice Committee.

Paton called for the conference to "mobilize the entire province" against
Croup Areas and asked the NIC to undertake sponsorship of the Vigilance

Committee to accomplish this.

Tlie

Provincial Vigilance Committee was to

-Group Areas
concentrate on changing White opinion and on organizing anti
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protests among the Indians.
Tne new organization, however, never played an effective role.

The

members present at the Committee's first meeting did not represent a
serious broadening of

tlie

Congress Alliance.

seven were from the NIC, one each from the

Of the sixteen people present,

AiNC

and COD and two from the

South African Congress of Trade Unions, a Congress Alliance affiliate.

Of

the remaining five representatives, two were from the Liberal party and the

remainder were divided among the Combined Ratepayers Association, an Indian
group, the Federation of

(

African) Social Clubs, and the Indian Youth

9

Congress

During the years 1956 and 1957, the Vigilance Committee held public

meetings throughout Natal, but was unable to prevent the proclamation of
Group Areas in Durban in 1958.

The proclamation caused what the Liberal

party newspaper Contact described as the "biggest political demonstration
10

ever staged by the Indian community."

Indian schools and shops in Durban

were closed, but the protest meetings did little beyond passing a resolution
asking the Government to witlidraw the proclamation.
resistance was not mentioned by the NIC speakers.

Further passive
Instead the NIC reverted

to opposition tactics tliat would have been approved by its NIO rival.

A

petition was circulated to gather signatures for submission to the Union
parliajTient urging repeal of Group Areas,

and the NIC announced its lawyers

would challenge the proclamation's legality

m

11

the Court system.

The restrained nature of the NIC's response to Group Areas in Durban
is not surprising when the difficulty of maintaining a sense of urgency

among Indians is noted.

Tliis

had been cited as a problem by NIC orga:iizer
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George Singh in 1946, and the situation had not changed by 1958.

Only

thirty- five Indian property -o\vners were required to immediately vacate their

homes by the 1958 proclamation, and even these were permitted to retain
ownership.

An immediate resistance effort would therefore have been

impractical, even if the NIC

liad

been prepared to wage one.

At

tlie

same

time, Indians were required to register with the Government for eventual

removal within thirty days of the proclamation.

Indians resisting this

provision were liable to an initial fine of LlOO and eventual confiscation
of their property without compensation if their refusal continued.

12

Tne

NIC could offer no protection against these penalties and the majority of
Indians were not wealthy enough to suffer the consequences of non-

registration.

During the five years from the proclamation of Group Areas in Durban
until the banning of most Indian Congress leaders in 1963, the Congress

Alliance remained without an effective tool to challenge the continuing
application of the Nationalist government's apartheid program.

The

Congresses, for instance, regularly repeated a demand for the convening of
13

a National Convention to draft a new constitution for South Africa.

Tlie

Government, of course, refused and the Congresses were powerless to enforce

their demand.

Work stoppages in the form of "stay-at-home" strkes were

attempted several times, with mixed results.

In June, 1961, thousands of

workers reportedly stayed away from their jobs at various cities to protest
the Government's failure to hold a National Convention.

New Age reported

"disunity
Indian support in Durban as "substantial", but also noted that

prevented the fullest joint action between Indians and Africans

m

Natal.

,,1
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The animosities of the 1950

NIC:

's liad

not yet been overcome.

Tliree Causes of Failure

The failure of Indian confrontationists to rally their people for

militant protest against apartlieid should not be interpreted as a v/illing
acceptance of White supremacy by Indians

.

Indians opposed segregation in

principle and did not welcome the imposition of legislative apartheid in
South Africa.

At

tlie

same time, most Indians were unwilling to commit

themselves to political action against the Government.
already been suggested for this reluctance:

Several reasons have

poor relations between Africans

snd Indians, the obvious intransigence of Miite authority which made victory

unlikely, and the failure of NIC leaders to adequately organize their
followers.

Tliese factors

were interrelated and it will be useful to review

them here.
From 1939 until 1946, the segregation issue aroused the Indian

community to the point where Indian confrontationists were able to use it
as the main issue in their struggle witli the accommodationists

.

Enthusiasm

for passive resistance was strong in the Transvaal in 1939 and in Natal in
1946.

Control of this issue was the necessary first step for Dadoo and

Naicker and they used it effectively against their political opponents.
From this beginning, however, the confrontationists were unable to construct
viable political organizations.

Enthusiasm was not transformed into

enduring political support.
of
The most important reason for this failure was the inability
viable
confrontationist leaders to demonstrate that confrontation was a
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policy.
in 1946.

This became apparent during the first post-war resistance campaign

The crucial date was October, 1946, when the South African

government successfully ignored the weak opposition of the United Nations
to its Indian segregation policy.

Tlie

NIC's 1946 resistance campaign had

been designed to pealc vdth the meeting of the United Nations General
Assembly.

IVlien

that meeting passed with no change in the domestic situation,

the resistance collapsed.

The confront at ionists were never again able to

generate the enthusiasm for resistance to apartheid created during

nine montlis of 1946.

tiie

first

Confrontation had been revealed as an ineffective

tactic when not supported by external intervention.

To the leaders of the NIC, the failure of the 1946 movement demonstrated
an obvious fact:

policy.

Indians by tliemselves were unable to influence South African

During the Gandlii years, partial victories had been won through the

intervention of the British and Indian governments in South Africa's
internal affairs, under the demands of Imperial responsibility.
that intervention,

White domination

IVliite

Without

opinion would have permitted no concessions against

and it is probable that some version of an Indian Groups

Areas policy would have been implemented long before 1950.

By the 1940 's,

Imperial intervention was largely a relic of the past.

United Nations

Tlie

was not willing, and in any case was unable, to assume the role of

international guardian of South African Indians.

This, more than any direct

action by the South Africaai government against the NIC, was responsible for
the collapse of the 1946 resistajice.

Until October, Indians were willing to

prompt
face jail sentences and fines in the belief that their example would

United Nations intervention.

It did not, and George Naicker became a symbol
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o£ resistance rather than the leader of

a political organization.

Antipathy between Indians and Africans was thus not the primary
cause
of the NIC's inipotence.

It is reasonable to assume, however, that

confrontationists support for the Congress Alliance was not shared by
the
general Indian community and

tliat

this attitude worked to prevent a revival

of Indian participation in NIC political movements during the 1950 's.

Even

if Indians had accepted the Congress Alliance argument that a successful

multi-racial alliance would bring about the defeat of apartheid, they were
still faced with

choice between being a racial minority in

dominated South Africa, or in a Wliite-ruled society.
Africans

liad

aii

African-

Indian relations with

never been close and in Durban especially

tlie

tension between

the two races was evident in disputes over trade and housing rights.

NIC

leaders preaclied that the racial hostility existed only because of White
rule, but it is not clear that the average Indian was willing to accept
this.

Certainly the comments of both NIC and ANC officials in the mid-

1950

indicate that Africans and Indians were reluctant to cooperate with

's

one another.

Tlie

Congress Alliance was not able in fifteen years to

reverse racial patterns
five years.

tliat

had been developed during

tlie

previous seventy-

This is in retrospect not surprising, but in the 1950 's it

meant failure for the Congress movement's goal of multi-racial anti- apartheid
campaigns

Given these two circumstances --that Indians did not believe the NIC
could achieve its goals through confrontation, and that Indians were
reluctant to join an alliance with Africans --the inability of NIC officials
to construct a strong political organization was inevitable.

Membership

150

disappeared because there was no apparent reason to belong to the NIC,
despite the limited obligations incurred by joining.

Branches did not

bother to maintain communications witli provincial headquarters because the
headquarters officials were not engaged in political work of interest to
the branches.

Building a successful political organization is difficult

when supported by the most enthusiastic members; building a successful
organization with an apathetic membership is impossible.

Provincial

conferences could discover no practical solutions to the organizational

problem because none would work until Indians were first convinced that
the NIC was necessary to their welfare.

This triad of circumstances made

tlie

Indians were never so convinced.

South African government's task

in defeating the Congress Alliance easier than it is often depicted by

Congress meinbers

.

The baimings and detentions which began in earnest in

1952 without question prevented NIC leaders from dealing with their political

problems.

It is improbable, however, that had banning and detentions never

occured the NIC leadership would have been able to solve its difficulties.
Until late 1952, the NIC

was relatively free to prepare its followers for

the rigors of political combat with White authority.

That the NIC failed

in this task was demonstrated by the poor Indian response to the Defiance

campaign of 1952.

For the NIC, the Defiance movement had already failed

before the South African parliament passed the Public Safety Act and

Criminal Law Amendir.ent Act.

Indians abstained from politics after the

activity of the
resistance campaign of 1946 and the basic cause was not the

South African police.
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Tne Future of Indian Politics

As an independent political force, Indians have no political future
in South Africa.

It is probable that tlieir minority status ensures that

Indians will not again seek the political importance that confrontationist
leaders claimed in the 1950

's.

Instead, the pattern of accommodation to

the apartheid structure which emerged in the 1960
in the immediate future.

's

is likely to prevail

During the past decade, the Soutli African

government has acknowledged Indians as a permaiient part of the South African

population, while at the same time establishing the institutional structures
to control Indians under the apartheid system.

The Indian response reveals

a continued distaste for apartheid, combined with a resignation that, for

the moment at least, no other political system is likely to emerge.
Tlie

South African government established in 1964 a National Indian

Council to act as a spokesman for the Indian community during the

implementation of Group Areas.

In 1965 the

to the South African Indian Council.

nai.ie

of

tlie

group was chaaiged

Members were appointed by the Minister

of the Interior, but the Goverraiient offered the possibility that in the

future members might be elected by the Indian community.

Tne Council

initially was opposed by both the NIC and NIO, but individual Indians have

been willing to serve on it.

In 1968, P. R. Pather, a fomier accoranodationist

leader of the NIO, accepted membership.

That the Indian Council can operate only under guidelines established

by the Minister of the Interior is clear.

Indians may raise problems

oppose
encountered during the implementation of Group Areas, but may not

152

Group Areas itself.

opposition to the

Thus when the first Council attempted to restate Indian

declaration of Durban's Cato Manor district as a

area, the Government refused to accept the recommendation.
hajid,

On

tiie

IVliite

other

the Council has been more successful with proposals designed to improve

Indian welfare within the guidelines imposed by the apartheid system.

Thus

the Government has accepted Council proposals to abolish fees for Indian

inter-provincial visiting permits and agreed to consider creation of an
Indian Investment Corporation to aid Indian businessmen to relocate in new
15

Group Areas.

Neither Gandhi's hope that

IVliite

opinion might be educated to grant

Indians equal status nor Dadoo's belief that direct political action could

defeat the apartheid system have been realized.

However reluctantly,

Indians have been required to accommodate themselves to apartheid as inter-

preted by the dominant Wliite minority.

Should

IVliite

rule in South Africa

end, it is likely that Indians would find themselves required to make

similar accommodation with the new African rulers.

happen is beyond the scope of this work.

iVhether or not that will
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Minutes of the Tliird Annual General
.

Natal Indian Congress and African National Congress. Statement Issued
by Joint Meeting o_f African ajid Indian Leaders in Durban on
~
~~
Sunday 6th FcBruary , 1949
.

,

Natal Provincial Vigilance Committee, ftinutes of Inaugural Meeting of
the Natal Provincial Vigilance Committee. June, 1956.

National Action Committee of the Congress Alliance. Report of the
National Action Committee _5 Decembe r 1953 to the Secretary
General of the ANC and the Joint Honorary Secretaries of the SAIC.

^

National Action Council of the Congress of the People.
Forward to the Congress of the People
May 17,
.

Press Statement:
1955"^

Report of

tlie National Action Council of the_ Congress of the People to
the Joint Executives of the ANC, SAIC , SACPO , and~"tHe~SACOD nTS.
,

South African Indian Congress
African Indian C ongress

.

,

Twenty -Second Congress of the South
October, 1956.

and African National Congress.
Statement Issued b^ Joint
Meeting of African and Indian Leaders Held in Xirban on Sunday
6th February 1949
I

.

Secretarial Report Submitted to Bi-ennial
Transvaal Indian Congress
General Meeting of the Transvaal Indian Congress August 1959
.

,

,

11th Annual Conference
Transvaal Indian Youth Congress.
Indian Youth Congress April 1956
,

,

Indian Youth Congress

Indian Youth Congress

,

,

April

Transvaal

,

Transvaal

,

15th Annual Conference, Transvaal
October , 1960
.

.

V.

14th Annual Conference
1959
,

,

.

16th Annual Conference, August, 1961

.

17th Annual Conference, Au gust , 1962

.

Letters

Note: Unless indicated, letters were either unsigned or the signatures
were not legible.
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Natal Action Council of the Congress of the People. January 19, 1955:
From N. T. Naicker to the Secretary of the National Action
Council
Natal Indian Congress. November 1, 1956: From L. Moonsamy for
Constitutional Sub-Committee to: "All Branch Secretaries".

Natal Indian Congress, Merebank Branch. July 11, 1956: From
Balli, Secretary, to: "All Members of the Committee".

R.

S.

National Action Council of tlie Congress of the People.
December 20, 1954: From Y. Cachalia for the Secretariat:
"To All Provincial and Regional Committees".

January 19, 1955: From P. Beyleveld for the Secretariat:
"To All Regions and Provinces".
January 31, 1955:

"To All Regions and Provinces".

February 4, 1955:

"To All Regions and Provinces".

"To All Regional and Provincial Executives of
the ANC, SAIC, COD and SACPO".

March 3, 1955:

March 18, 1955:

"To All Regional Committees".

April 29, 1955: "To the Secretary, Natal Action Council of the
Congress of the People".

May 24, 1955: From Ismail Gangat: "To All Branch Officials
and Volunteers of the Congress of the People".
June 7, 1955:

"To All Regional Committees".

National Consultative Committee of the ANC, SAIC, SACPO, SACOD.
January 19, 1955: " To All Regions and Provinces".

Newspapers

Advance

Cape Town.

,

Contac t, Cape Town.

November, 1952 -October

February, 195 8 -December

Fighting Talk , Johannesburg.

Guardian

,

Cape Town.

1954.

,

,

1961.

January, 19 54 -February

,

January, 1939 -July, 1952.

Indian Opinion , Durban.

January, 1939 -December

,

1956.

1963.
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New Age, Cape Town.
NIC News

,

Durban.

October, 1954 -November

,

1961.

Published irregularly, 1952-1954.

The Call , Durba:i. Published irregularly during the Congress o£ the
People campaign, 1954-1955.

